It is a frigid 20 below zero at midnight in March 1945. Bright moonlight illuminates the Norwegian sky. Jaevsjo Lake is frozen solid. White parachutes appear in the night sky and drift slowly and silently to touchdown on the shores of the lake.
After landing, Maj. William E. Colby approaches his Norwegian reception party and asks, “Is the fishing good in this lake now?”
Colby’s seemingly casual inquiry is much more than an interest in casting a fishing line. He has just spoken the password to launch a strategically important World War II paramilitary sabotage operation for the Office of Strategic Services: Operation RYPE.
William E. Colby was born on January 4, 1920, in St. Paul, Minn. The son of a career Army officer, Colby’s mobile childhood ingrained in him an interest in world affairs and a thirst for adventure. These interests would lead him to pursue higher education, study law, join the military, and eventually become the 10th Director of Central Intelligence.
After earning a bachelor’s degree at Princeton University in 1940, Colby spent a year at Columbia University Law School. With the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and America’s entry into World War II, Colby’s world changed. He felt called to serve his nation and volunteered for active duty in the U.S. Army as a second lieutenant. His Army experience kept him busy, but it did not satisfy his greater interest for the excitement of the war, inclusion in the action, and the political aspects of the war.
To satisfy his thirst for adventure, Colby turned in 1943 to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA. During his time with the OSS, Colby commanded several exciting and strategically important operations overseas, including Operation RYPE.
The primary goal of Operation RYPE was to sabotage the Nordland Railway system and effectively delay 150,000 German troops from returning to join the final battle in Germany. The Nordland, a north-south stretch of railroad lines between the towns of Narvik and Trondheim, was perhaps the only means for the Germans to move their troops; the British Navy occupied the sea routes and the plentiful snow made the roadways impassable. The Germans’ dependence on the railroad lines made the lines a strategically appealing target and a means by which OSS could significantly impact the war.
After several weather-related delays, Operation RYPE was put into action on March 24, 1945. In a joint effort, 35 men from the OSS and the OSS-trained Norwegian Special Operations Group (NORSO) collaborated in the U.S. Army’s first and only combined ski-parachute undertaking.
Eight U.S. Air Force B-24 Liberator bombers dispatched from Sweden that night, but only four planes made successful drops in the vicinity of the drop site, Jaevsjo Lake. Of the remaining four planes, two got lost and returned to Sweden, one inadvertently made its drop in Sweden, and one fatally crashed.
The combination of bad weather, inexperienced pilots, and mechanical problems left Major Colby and his crew short-handed and ill-equipped to carry out a primary objective of Operation RYPE: the demolition of the great Grana Bridge, a key bridge in aiding the homecoming of German forces.
Major Colby and his team of now 24 officers refocused their efforts to deter German forces. Colby and his men skied miles across the Norwegian terrain in the area between Jørstad and Valøy, cutting railroad lines and destroying bridges.
As the group sought targets, Colby observed that, unlike most tunnels and bridges, the Tangen Bridge was only sporadically guarded. Colby and his men took advantage of this and successfully demolished this central transportation route for the southern movement of German troops.
After the destruction of this key bridge, Colby shifted the focus of Operation RYPE to pursue smaller German military targets in an effort to preserve the Norwegian infrastructure. Allied victory was close at hand and the war was coming to an end. It was unlikely that German troops would continue home for the final battle.
Unfavorable snow conditions began to make ski transport difficult for Colby and his men. In addition, the unit learned that the Germans were patrolling the nearby areas. Given the situation, Colby and his men assumed a low-profile and went into hiding. Despite their concealment, a five-man German patrol chanced upon their hiding place. After a short fight, Colby and his unit defeated the German soldiers.
Colby and his troops then received orders to proceed to Steinkjer, the first among several celebratory stops they would make en route to Trondheim. Upon their arrival in Trondheim, Colby and his troops were greeted by the surrender of several thousand more German troops, marking the end of Operation RYPE. Despite a shaky start, the operation was a huge success.
Within just a few weeks, Major Colby and his men succeeded in sabotaging a key bridge and numerous railroad lines throughout Norway. They strategically delayed the southern movement of German troops and drastically hindered the German war effort.
While Operation RYPE had a significant military impact, the political impact of the operation was even more enduring. The Norwegians recognized the American loss of life on their soil on behalf of their freedom, and the alliance between the two countries was strengthened.
Major Colby was honored with the Silver Star and St. Olaf’s Medal to commemorate the valor he displayed in leading this strategic operation.
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June 7, 2010
The Central Intelligence Agency today paid tribute to its men and women who have died in the line of duty. Twelve stars recently were added to its Memorial Wall, which now commemorates the lives of 102 courageous and talented Americans lost in service to their country.
Standing before the wall in the lobby of CIA Headquarters, Director Leon E. Panetta said: “More than six decades ago, the CIA was given its charter to operate overseas in secrecy, in defense of America, in defense of its allies, and – most importantly – in defense of its values. Across that arc of history—from our struggle against Communism to the war with al-Qa’ida—CIA’s mission has brought our silent warriors to the enemy’s frontier and beyond.”
“No matter when or where they served, or whether their names are known to the world or only to us, each cherished colleague remains a constant source of inspiration and courage. We take strength from their powerful example as we carry on their vital work and the vital work of this Agency,” said Director Panetta.
Seven of the 12 new stars honor those killed last December in eastern Afghanistan. Director Panetta noted that President Obama, at a memorial service for the seven, called on the Agency’s workforce to continue their work by winning the war against al-Qa’ida and keeping America safe.
“Every day, throughout the world, the CIA is answering that call as a sacred commitment,” said Director Panetta. “It is a mission without break. It is a mission without pause – one that must, and will, end in victory over hatred, ignorance, and oppression. That triumph, when it comes – and it will come – will be the product of the many who draw strength from the seven who died at Khost.”
Five of the new stars honor those who have died in recent years while engaged in clandestine assignments. Continuing operational sensitivities require that the details of their work remain classified.
Speaking of all of those whose lives have been taken while working with CIA, Director Panetta explained: “They remind us, as do the losses suffered by our brothers and sisters in uniform, that our nation’s liberty and security is not free. It must be fought for by every generation. Their stories reaffirm that America is blessed with brave and selfless patriots who are willing to put their lives on the line, who are willing to shoulder that great responsibility.”
“For all of us—family, friends, and colleagues—they are heroes,” Director Panetta said. “They are our heroes. They are America’s heroes. And that’s how we will remember them.”
Hundreds of employees, former officers, and family members and friends of those who have died in service with CIA attend the memorial ceremony each year.

June 11, 2010
CIA Director Leon E. Panetta has appointed Gerald P. Hamilton to lead the Agency’s diversity programs, including its public outreach efforts. Hamilton, a senior officer in the National Clandestine Service, brings years of Agency experience to the position. He will head the new Employee Resource Center, which Director Panetta created to combine, focus, and increase the capabilities of existing offices responsible for promoting diversity and equal opportunity within the Agency.
“As a seasoned leader, Gerry has a clear understanding of how crucial a diverse workforce truly is,” Director Panetta said. “He also brings to the job a deep commitment to equal opportunity for all officers, both in the field and at Headquarters.”
Hamilton previously served in a number of overseas posts and was Deputy Chief of the NCS Human Resources Staff. He received a Bachelor of Arts from Morgan State University and a Master of Arts from The American University.
The Center will be a single point of contact for Agency employees seeking information, advice, or assistance on a wide range of issues, including anti-discrimination laws, disability accommodations, dispute resolution, and mentoring.
“Fostering a workplace environment in which every officer can reach his or her full potential is one of my highest priorities,” said Director Panetta. “It is not simply a question of American law and values. It is decisive to our ability to get our job done in a complex world.”
Last year, Director Panetta announced an aggressive initiative to expand diversity within the CIA workforce. “We must reflect the world our Agency engages,” he said. “Diversity is one of our nation’s greatest strengths, and that creates a natural advantage over our adversaries.”
The CIA has been recognized for its efforts to build greater diversity. The CIA received the 2009 Intelligence Community Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity Program Award. DiversityBusiness.com also named the CIA one of America’s top government agencies for multicultural business opportunities for 2010.
On Monday, June 7, family members, friends, and Agency employees gathered near the Memorial Wall in the lobby of the Original Headquarters Building to honor CIA officers who gave their lives in the line of duty. During this year’s service, 12 new stars were unveiled, bringing the total number on the wall to 102.
As Agency employees gaze at the stars carved into the stark white marble, they are reminded of the Agency’s mission and why they come to work each day. This ceremony touches the lives of every Agency employee, whether they are just beginning their career or have served many years.
Some Agency employees feel so strongly about the Memorial Ceremony that they choose to participate in it, whether singing in the Agency choir — the Keynotes — or presenting a wreath of flowers as a member of the Honor Guard.
Douglas has participated in many ceremonies as a member of the Keynotes.
“As part of my being a officer of the Agency community at large, it is an honor and privilege to partake in the ceremony. In my 33 years here, the number of stars has grown significantly. It is totally humbling that so many of our colleagues have continued to perish in their effort to help the Agency fulfill its mission to the U.S. Government and its goal to keep America safe. I owe it to the named and unnamed deceased to spend a few minutes to show my respect for their sacrifice.”
Security Protective Officer Jason — an Agency employee of three years — participates in the Memorial Ceremony as a member of the Honor Guard.
“To me, the memorial ceremony is a way for us to honor the lives and the sacrifices made by the men and women who gave their lives serving their mission, protecting the American people,” Jason said.
The Memorial Ceremony is a tradition — started in 1987 — that has evolved and grown over the years. Agency employees find different aspects of the ceremony more meaningful for different reasons.
In 1995, a roll call of all the employees — overt and covert — in the Book of Honor was added to the ceremony. The reading aloud of every name is only done during the Memorial Ceremony. Many Agency employees find this part of the ceremony the most moving.
“This is one time each year when each of our heroes is recognized individually, yet they are united on the Memorial Wall as one team, representing the mission and spirit of the Agency. They will never be forgotten,” said Christy, an Agency officer of seven years.
“The memorial ceremony is an important event for all of us because it helps remind each of us, regardless of our Directorate or position, that we are all working together toward a common goal in an uncommon endeavor,” said Craig. “The people honored gave their lives in public service. Their service is veiled from the public view, so we are the only ones who can remember their sacrifice, the only ones who can offer comfort to their families and colleagues.”
The wreath laying is another important tradition in the Memorial Ceremony. During this part of the ceremony, a member of the Honor Guard — accompanied by the Director — places a wreath of flowers in front of the Book of Honor.
Jason has participated in the past two Memorial Ceremonies as a member of the Agency’s Honor Guard. As a participant, he finds the wreath laying the most meaningful moment during the ceremony.
“While it is only a small part, it is a moving and powerful staple that brings the ceremony to a close,” Jason said.
Other Agency officers find the Memorial Wall itself the most moving part of the tradition because it serves as an everyday reminder of the price their colleagues paid in service to our nation.
“Every time I walk past the memorial wall, I take the time to think about our colleagues who sacrificed their lives for our freedom,” said 20-year Agency officer Kendra. “I reflect on their accomplishments and pray for their families.”
“Both the Memorial Wall and the ceremony are part of an important tradition that not only brings us together as an Agency, but makes us feel more connected to our predecessors—and proud of our heroes from every generation. The wall is a powerful symbol—one of quiet heroism—that reflects CIA’s highest ideals,” said 20-year Agency employee Matthew.
“To drive past a traditional cemetery, you know that families and friends gathered there to bury their loved one. Many times, hardly anyone returns to the plot after the burial. With the memorial wall, we have a constant reminder of the person behind each star. The stars are viewed dozens of times each day and hopefully each person looking at the wall has a great sense of gratitude for each person represented on the wall,” said Douglas.
Twelve-year employee Michele refers to a 2001 speech by then CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin:
“The stars on the Memorial Wall are more than a symbol. They are more than history. They are a priceless part of who we are.”
For many employees, the Agency is like a family. The Memorial Ceremony is a time to remember and reflect on the sacrifices some members of the Agency family have made.
“For me, the Agency is a family,” said Craig. “We may not know each officer who works here, but the bonds between all of us are strong.”
“As with any family member who has died, keeping them in your thoughts and prayers is important,” said Douglas. “For the Agency family, having an annual ceremony to remember our fallen colleagues is especially important. The wall of stars is a constant reminder of the work that we do and the price that is paid by some member of our Agency family in the course of their daily work.”
Read more about this year’s Memorial Ceremony.
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During the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in operations against Communist China to try to divert Chinese military and security resources from the Korean peninsula. Among those CIA efforts was trying to establish a resistance network in Manchuria. CIA trained ethnic Chinese agents and used its proprietary company Civil Air Transport (CAT) to air drop them into Kirin Province and also to resupply them as they established contacts with, it was hoped, anticommunist forces in Manchuria. Anticipating the need to extract an agent from the ground so that he could provide needed intelligence, CIA had trained one of its agents in a unique aerial exfiltration method known as the All American system.
The answer was the All American System: a modified version of a mail retrieval system created during the 1920s. The system was improved by All American Aviation before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
The All American System consisted of two steel poles set 54 feet apart in the ground on either side of the mailbag or object to be retrieved. A transfer line, which was attached to the person, was strung between the two poles. When it was time for the pick-up, an aircraft would fly slowly toward the setup at about 90 mph trailing a hook. Once it reached the poles, the hook would snag the transfer line and pick up the item on the ground. A flight mechanic would then pull it on board.
During World War II, the All American System was picked up by the Army Air Forces and further developed. The first successful human pickup occurred on September 5, 1943. Lt. Alex Doster, a paratrooper, volunteered to test the improved system. It took less than three minutes to retrieve him once he was picked up.
The Army Air Forces also developed a package containing telescoping poles, transfer line and a harness that could be dropped by air. The first operational use of the system came in February 1944 when the Army Air Forces retrieved a glider from a remote location in Burma. While the Army Air Forces never used it in operations to retrieve people, the British successfully retrieved agents with the All American System.
In the fall of 1952, CAT pilots in the Far East tested the system many times before successfully retrieving a mechanic.
On the evening of November 29, 1952, CIA officers John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau left a Korean airfield in a CAT C-47 aircraft for Kirin Province to retrieve members of a team that had been working since the previous July. A double agent betrayed the team and the Chinese shot down the plane as it came in for the pickup. The pilots — Norman Schwartz and Robert Snoddy — were killed, but Downey and Fecteau survived and were captured, tried, and imprisoned by the Chinese. Fecteau was not released until December 1971; Downey was freed in March 1973.
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The Intelligence Community today draws wisdom and inspiration from the past. The following article is the second in a series showcasing exceptional intelligence stories from history. This article focuses on the capture of Fort Ticonderoga.
The capture of Fort Ticonderoga, New York, was an early example of how skillful initial use of intelligence could contribute to successful military campaigns for months and years afterward. In this instance, good scouting and bold steps by the Americans, together with poor situational awareness on the part of the British, combined in a tactical victory with great strategic implications.
Fort Ticonderoga formed a major French strongpoint during the French and Indian War (1756-1763). While it never fell to British forces, it was surrendered upon the French defeat. From then on, Fort Ticonderoga was manned by a skeleton British garrison and soon fell into disrepair. By the time of the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in 1775, Ticonderoga was all but forgotten.
Ticonderoga sat astride the inland water route linking New York City and Canada, making it a vital strategic supply and communications link. Patriot forces had clashed with British regulars at Concord and Lexington, Massachusetts, in April 1775, and had considerable interest in the fort's armaments and location. In addition, according to intelligence gathered by Patriot sympathizers, the fort still contained munitions and artillery badly need by the fledgling American Continental Army.
An expedition of 400 men under Benedict Arnold was soon mounted to capture the fort. Arnold, given a colonel's commission by the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, soon rendezvoused with Ethan Allen, who commanded a Vermont militia force known as the Green Mountain Boys. Allen, also elected a colonel, entered into a shared command agreement with Arnold after his Green Mountain Boys protested serving under a man who hailed from outside Vermont.
By 2 a.m. on May 10, 1775, the American force had assembled on the shores of Lake Champlain opposite Fort Ticonderoga. Scouting units had gathered sufficient intelligence to determine that the garrison consisted of only 42 men, wholly unaware of the approaching Patriot force.
The same scouts had also noted, however, that only two boats were available to transport the attacking force across the lake. With so few boats available, Arnold and Allen divided their men and decided to cross in turn. They piled 83 men into the two boats and successfully crossed the lake unheard or observed. Yet as dawn approached, concerns arose to the possibility of alarming the sleeping garrison as the Patriot forces continued to shuttle across Lake Champlain. Fearful of losing the element of surprise, the Americans attacked Ticonderoga's south gate, manned by a single British sentry. The attackers roused the fort commander from his bed, and Arnold reputedly demanded the fort's surrender "in the name of the great Jehovah and the Continental Congress." The fort fell without casualties and without a shot being fired.
The victory at Fort Ticonderoga emboldened Patriot spirits as news spread throughout the 13 colonies. In addition, the fort served as a base for the subsequent capture of Fort Crown Point further to the north and as a bridgehead for Arnold's army then preparing to invade British Canada.
Most important, however, the artillery and munitions alleviated the Continental Army's immediate need for heavier weapons. Indeed, its 43 cannons and 16 mortars were soon dragged over the Adirondack Mountains and delivered to Gen. Henry Knox who used them against British forces in Boston. Positioned on Dorchester Heights, then outside the city, the Ticonderoga artillery in Patriot hands soon made a continued British presence in Boston impossible, forcing their retreat in March 1776 to Halifax, Nova Scotia.
The early capture of this strategic fort had an impact years later. Due to the loss of Ticonderoga, the route between the British forces in Canada and those in New York City was severed, forcing the British to reform their command structure by splitting Canadian and American commands. Later, the difficulties and failures of these separated commands to coordinate their efforts proved crucial to the American victory at Saratoga in 1777.
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![]() US Congress approves new Iran sanctions Washington (AFP) June 24, 2010 - The US Congress on Thursday sent President Barack Obama a sweeping package of tough new energy and financial sanctions on Iran, aiming to force Tehran to halt its suspected nuclear weapons program. The US Senate and House of Representatives approved the legislation -- which backers described as the toughest ever unilateral US sanctions against the Islamic republic -- by crushing 99-0 and 408-8 margins, respectively. The new measures, piled atop new UN Security Council and European sanctions, aimed to choke off Iran's access to imports of refined petroleum products like gasoline and jet fuel and curb its access to the international banking system. "Our goal is to target Iran where it will hurt the regime the most," said Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, who warned a nuclear-armed Tehran would "threaten the national security of the United States and of Israel." World powers led by Washington have accused the Islamic republic of seeking to build nuclear weapons and demanding it freeze its uranium enrichment activity, which can be a key step towards developing an atomic arsenal. The bill would shut US markets to firms that provide Iran with refined petroleum products that the oil-rich nation must import to meet demand because of a weak domestic refining capability. It also takes aim at firms that invest in Iran's energy sector, including non-US companies that provide financing, insurance, or shipping services. It could also see non-US banks doing business with certain blacklisted Iranian entities -- including Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and several banks -- shut out of the US financial system. "We will be posing a choice to companies around the world: Do you want to do business with Iran? Or do you want to business with the United States? We don't think that is much of a choice, but we will force companies to make it. They can't have it both ways," said Republican Senator John McCain. The bill would also enable US states and local governments to divest from foreign firms engaged in Iran's energy sector, and would tighten the existing US trade embargo on Iranian goods by curbing the number of exempted products. Lawmakers noted that Iran had rejected Obama's efforts, since taking office in January 2009, to engage Tehran diplomatically on issues from its nuclear program to its support for Islamist groups branded terrorists in Washington. "We are at a defining moment," said Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the top Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who called the bill "one of our last best hopes to force Iran to end its nuclear weapons program." But they also cautioned that the bill's impact would depend on whether Obama invoked its powers rather than use his considerable authority to waive some of the most punishing measures. "We do provide the tools, but there's little guarantee that they'll be used," complained Republican Representative Ed Royce, who warned the Obama administration "will have to be pressured into action." |
June 28, 2010
Senator Byrd taught us all what it means to be a faithful servant of our democracy. I was honored to know him for more than 40 years, having first met him when I came to Washington as a legislative aide. In the 1980s and 1990s, I worked closely with him on economic and budget issues. This man of humble roots was an eloquent orator, skilled legislator, unrivaled master of Senate rules and traditions, and staunch defender of the role of Congress in our three-branch system of government. He deeply believed that the responsibility of elected officials was to govern. In Washington, few people are irreplaceable, but Senator Byrd is one. He will be greatly missed and long remembered as both a champion of the poor and a true giant of the Senate.
Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon E. Panetta on Independence Day
We at the CIA celebrate our national birthday knowing that we help protect a great country. In defending it, we help preserve values fundamental to all humanity: that we are created equal, and that all people “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”
Those words are America. Our country holds a special place in the world. Our leaders are elected, our rights are clear, and our laws matter. We have championed those principles beyond our shores so that others can benefit from the truth and reason embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Its message is timeless and knows no borders.
CIA’s mission is to safeguard America. We can accomplish that only if we reflect the very best of America. That is a commitment each of us must make, each and every day. I am deeply grateful for your service—especially those of you on duty this weekend—and I’m very proud of your exceptional dedication to what Independence Day is all about.
Have a happy Fourth!
Leon E. Panetta
On July 4, 1956, Hervey Stockman piloted a U-2 through the skies over the Soviet Union. His mission was to collect photographic reconnaissance of important Soviet bases. Thousands of feet below Stockman and the U-2 were several Soviet MiG fighters trying to intercept the reconnaissance aircraft. July 4, 2010 marks the 54th anniversary of Hervey Stockman’s mission—the first flight of the U-2 over the Soviet Union.
Hervey Stockman was born in Andover, N.J., in 1922. After attending Princeton University for two years, Stockman enlisted in the Aviation Cadet Program of the U.S. Army Air Forces in September 1942.
During World War II, Stockman was assigned to England where he flew the P-51 Mustang. He was credited with destroying two enemy aircraft in aerial combat and flew 68 combat missions before leaving active duty in 1945.
After the war, Stockman attended the Pratt Institute School of Art and Design where he majored in industrial design. Following graduation, Stockman work for General Motors as an automotive designer.
With the Cold War becoming more tense as the Soviet Union built up its nuclear strike capabilities, President Eisenhower authorized the construction of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft in 1954. Its purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union and collect strategic intelligence. This mission was entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Kelly Johnson at Lockheed’s “Skunkworks” designed the U-2. It would be flown by one pilot, at altitudes of 65,000 to 70,000 feet at subsonic speed. The U-2’s design allowed it to glide and stay aloft for more than eight hours. By 1956 the U-2 had been tested and was ready for its first flight over the Soviet Union.
In 1956, Stockman was recalled to active duty in the U.S. Air Force. Initially, Stockman was stationed in Bergman, Texas flying F-84 Thunderjets. However, Stockman’s experience flagged him for an important Cold War mission: overhead reconnaissance of the Soviet Union.
Stockman was chosen to fly the very first flight over the Soviet Union. On the Fourth of July in 1956, Stockman left Wiesbaden in West Germany and crossed the Soviet border near Grodno in Belarus. The flight continued over several bomber bases in central Belarus, then north to naval shipyards and bomber bases at Leningrad. Stockman concluded his flight by passing over military facilities in the Baltic States before returning to Germany.
The entire flight lasted eight hours and 45 minutes. During his flight, Stockman was tracked by Soviet radar and a number of MiG fighters attempted to intercept him.
After this successful flight, Stockman went to on to fly several more U-2 missions over the Soviet Union and the Middle East between 1956 and 1958.
The U-2 Stockman flew is currently on display at the National Air & Space Museum in Washington, D.C.
Following his U-2 missions, Stockman returned to active duty in the U.S. Air Force. During the 1960s, he began flying combat missions in Southeast Asia. In May 1967, Stockman was forced to eject from his F-4 Phantom over North Vietnam and was taken prisoner. He was held for 2,093 days before being released during Operation Homecoming in 1973.
After recovering from his injuries, Stockman attended the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. He graduated in 1974 and went on to serve with NATO in Europe and as Director of Joint Test and Evaluation at Kirkland Air Force Base, N.M. Stockman retired from the Air Force at the rank of colonel in December 1978.
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Unclassified extracts from Studies in Intelligence Volume 54, Number 2 (June 2010)
Of Novels, Intelligence and Policymaking
In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller, 1901–1914 [PDF 918.6KB*]
Dr. Christopher R. Moran and Dr. Robert Johnson
Training for War and Espionage
Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II [PDF 2.1MB*]
Dr. John Whiteclay Chambers II
A Historical Perspective on Intelligence
The French Napoleonic Staff View of HUMINT [PDF 6.1MB*]
As translated from German by Rick Sanders
A Window on the Development of Modern Intelligence
Claire Lee Chennault and the Problem of Intelligence in China [PDF 1.7MB*]
Bob Bergin
Reflections on Service
A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden [PDF 67.6KB*]
Mark Mansfield
Working for the “War Czar”
Lessons for Intelligence Support to Policymaking during Crises [PDF 410.3KB*]
Paul D. Miller
Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq [PDF 39.1KB*]
Matthew P.
Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Corps Codebreakers, Translators, and Interpreters in the Pacific War [PDF 36.8KB*]
Stephen C. Mercado
Securing the City: Inside America’s Best Counterterror Force—The NYPD [PDF 28.8KB*]
Reviewed by Stephen J. Garber
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf [PDF 129.6KB*]
Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
*Adobe® Reader® is needed to view Adobe PDF files. If you don't already have Adobe Reader installed, you may download the current version at www.adobe.com (opens in a new window). [external link disclaimer]
Bob Bergin is a former foreign service officer who has spent many years in Thailand. He has written on the history of aviation in Southeast Asia and China and on operations of the OSS in that region.
Dr. John Whiteclay Chambers II is Professor of History at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. He is also editor-in-chief of The Oxford Companion to American Military History and author most recently of OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, a report for the National Park Service, with an updated version to be published by Rutgers University Press.
Stephen J. Garber is acting Chief Historian at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in Washington, DC. He has master’s degrees in Public and International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh and in Science and Technology Studies from Virginia Tech.
Dr. Robert Johnson is Lecturer in the History of War at the University of Oxford. He has particular interest in World War I, the Indian Army, and conflict in Central and South Asia.
Mark Mansfield is CIA officer-in-residence at University of Miami. During 2006–2009, he was CIA’s Director of Public Affairs.
Stephen C. Mercado serves in the Open Source Center of the Director of National Intelligence. He is a frequent, and award-winning, contributor to Studies.
Paul D. Miller is an analyst with the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence.
Dr. Christopher R. Moran is a Research Scholar at the University of Warwick. His research focuses on the development of government secrecy in Cold War Britain. Interests also include spy fiction and growth of intelligence communities in the 20th century.
Matthew P. is a clandestine service officer assigned to the CIA History Staff.
Hayden B. Peake is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.
Rick Sanders is senior DIA officer on detail to CIA. He is a retired US Army Reserve colonel and foreign area officer.
[Top of page]On July 11,1946 the new Central Intelligence Group formally created its first operational unit, the Office of Special Operations. Formed from the remnants of William Donovan's wartime Office of Strategic Services — the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency — OSO marked a bold departure from the human intelligence strategy previously practiced by the United States. Simply put, OSO was designed to be a national asset, running liaison relationships and collecting intelligence on behalf of the nation's highest decisionmakers. The capability would one day become a key part of the Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency.
In 1945 the Truman administration dismantled the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), sending most of its elements to the War Department for "salvage and liquidation." The War Department named two of these elements the "Strategic Services Unit" (SSU) and kept them busy running the former OSS missions in London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Cairo, Chungking, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Rangoon, as well as various smaller posts.
Early the next year, Administration officials decided to give the stations, personnel, and assets preserved in SSU to the newly created Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to form the nucleus of a permanent foreign intelligence capability.
Sidney Souers — the first Director of Central Intelligence — was responsible for carrying out the integration of SSU into CIG. Souers appointed a team to meet with SSU's chief, Brig. Gen. John Magruder, whose aides admitted that the old OSS had been hastily constructed and had allowed its energies to be divided across a variety of tasks.
The fragility of human source intelligence — its rarity and potentially great value — suggested to Magruder and his lieutenants that espionage should be tightly controlled and used only for the most important requirements. A new human intelligence organization would have to be highly proficient and report first and foremost to Washington, rather than to locally based diplomats and commanders.
The Truman Administration soon authorized Souers to arrange something like what Magruder had envisioned. In July 1946, CIG created a new entity called the Office of Special Operations (OSO). It was intended to become the new clandestine foreign intelligence service. Key personnel in SSU were given joint appointments in OSO, allowing them to work for both organizations simultaneously.
OSO screened all SSU employees and offered positions to the best of them; the rest were demobilized by SSU. In October 1946, OSO effectively rehired the remaining personnel of SSU. Six months later OSO took over SSU's last headquarters elements in Washington and SSU ceased to exist.
Not long afterward, one OSO officer recorded his feelings about the progress that the Office was making:
"Without question," he noted, "we are preparing to enter the big leagues in the intelligence business....Professionalism in the American intelligence service is a sine qua non if we are to be accepted on anything approaching an equal basis by other professional services with longer histories."
The high goals of the early OSO were perhaps too ambitious for the brand new CIG (which became the Central Intelligence Agency in September 1947), but considering that the United States had begun practicing the discipline of human intelligence by modern methods only after Pearl Harbor, it is impressive that CIA had a worldwide espionage capability at all by 1950.
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From President Truman on, each President has written a note of thanks to the men and women of the CIA. These notes are displayed with the President’s official photograph in the Presidential Gallery of the New Headquarters Building. This story is the third in a series about the relationship each president has had with the CIA. This article will focus on President Lyndon B. Johnson.
When Lyndon B. Johnson took office as president after John F. Kennedy’s assassination, he had very little experience with foreign affairs and intelligence. During his time in office (1963-69), President Johnson was faced with the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the war in Vietnam, the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, and efforts to reduce tension with the Soviet Union.
One of the most challenging tasks the director of an intelligence organization can face is gaining the trust of the president. But throughout all of these situations, President Johnson and the White House commanded the CIA’s support.
The Directors of Central Intelligence (DCI) during Johnson’s tenure — John A. McCone, William A. Raborn, and Richard M. Helms — faced the difficult task of establishing a relationship with a president who had little experience in intelligence.
DCIs McCone and Raborn didn’t have much luck with this task. It was DCI Helms who succeeded in building a rapport with President Johnson. The key intelligence achievement that won Johnson’s trust was the Agency’s accurate analysis of the Arab-Israeli War.
When the Arab-Israeli War broke out in June 1967, the CIA already had task forces operating and gathering information about the two sides’ strengths, weaknesses, and readiness for battle. Because of the Directorate of Intelligence’s (DI) foresight in this matter, DCI Helms was able to hand President Johns assessments of the situation in the Middle East only four hours after the request.
In addition to the quick turnaround, the intelligence produced was incredibly accurate. The DI’s assessment was correct about the timing, duration, and outcome of the war. Specifically, the reports indicated that the Israelis were in a strong position to win the war. This information resulted in President Johnson’s refusal to provide military supplies to Israel.
From then on, Johnson included Helms in all of the Tuesday lunches — weekly meetings with presidential advisers to discuss foreign policy matters.
At the beginning of his term, Johnson could not see much value in intelligence. However, Johnson had a change of heart after his successful interactions with the Agency:
“We have committed our lives, our property, our resources, and our sacred honor to the freedom and peace of other men, indeed to the freedom and peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that commitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices that Americans have made if we were not every hour of every day vigilant against every threat to peace and freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelligence Agency in this country.”
Carrying on the tradition started by President Truman following the Agency’s founding, President Johnson wrote a note thanking the men and women of the CIA for their service to the United States. He is the fourth president to write a note for the CIA’s Presidents’ Gallery:
“To the Central Intelligence Agency — with appreciation.”
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July 21, 2010
Director Leon E. Panetta announced today the appointment of John D. Bennett to be the next head of the National Clandestine Service. Mr. Bennett will succeed Michael J. Sulick, who is retiring.
“Every CIA Director relies on the wisdom, experience, and friendship of an exceptionally talented senior leadership team,” Director Panetta said in a message to Agency employees. “I have been very fortunate to have Mike Sulick on mine. As head of our National Clandestine Service for the past three years, he has guided complex operations under some of the most difficult circumstances imaginable. Our officers have had tremendous success against the full range of national security challenges, including terrorists, weapons proliferators, drug traffickers, rogue states, and hostile intelligence services.
“That record is, to Mike and everyone else familiar with it, a source of deep and enduring pride. I knew that he had come out of retirement in 2007, and that he would not be here forever. So when Mike told me a while back that he wanted to retire again this summer, I had to agree that he had more than earned it. Mike’s love of his Agency and his country are clear to all who have served with him over the decades. His expertise, judgment, courage, and candor have made all the difference.”
Director Panetta lauded Mr. Sulick’s years of public service, saying, “He can take satisfaction not only in the safety he helped provide our country, but in the officers he taught, mentored, and inspired, who, throughout the world, will continue this Agency’s unique and essential mission.”
Mr. Bennett joined the Agency in 1981, after service in the Marine Corps, and has spent most of his career in the foreign field, including four tours as Station Chief.
“John has impeccable credentials at the very core of intelligence operations—espionage, covert action, and liaison,” Director Panetta said. “He has been at the forefront of the fight against al-Qa’ida and its violent allies. We are fortunate to have a number of very gifted leaders within the NCS who are doing a great job of protecting our nation. John brings a unique set of talents to this position; he knows the topics and regions that are likely to shape our security agenda in the years ahead. But there is much more to it than that. He also understands the hardships and benefits of tough jobs, and he knows—in any environment—the mix of skills, capabilities, and partners that successful operations demand.”
Mr. Bennett’s senior positions at Headquarters include Chief of Special Activities Division, Deputy Chief of Africa Division, and Deputy Director of the NCS for Community HUMINT.
“John is an outstanding leader, devoted to the mission and those who get it done,” Director Panetta said. “He says what he thinks and he does what he says. I trust him, and I rely on him. He has a keen sense of the risks and opportunities inherent in every operational activity. He is supremely qualified to guide our National Clandestine Service to further success. On behalf of everyone at CIA, Michael Morell and I thank and congratulate John for taking this critical post. There is no finer espionage service than the one he is about to lead.”
The president and policymakers rely on insights from the Central Intelligence Agency to inform their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the first in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article will focus on open source intelligence.
Information does not have to be secret to be valuable. Whether in the blogs we browse, the broadcasts we watch, or the specialized journals we read, there is an endless supply of information that contributes to our understanding of the world. The Intelligence Community generally refers to this information as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). OSINT plays an essential role in giving the national security community as a whole insight and context at a relatively low cost.
OSINT is drawn from publicly available material, including:
CIA is responsible for collecting, producing, and promoting open source intelligence through its management of the DNI Open Source Center (OSC). OSC was established on November 1, 2005 in response to recommendations by the Robb-Silberman Commission, and is charged with a unique, Community-wide responsibility.
OSC and its worldwide network of partners have the skills, tools, and access necessary to produce high-quality open source intelligence. These capabilities include translations in over 80 languages; source, trends, and media analyses; specialized video and geospatial services; and rare cultural and subject matter expertise.
To OSC Director Douglas Naquin strong partnerships are absolutely essential.
“Given the variety and scope of the questions we can address through publicly available information, I believe it is incumbent on us to work across organizations — inside and outside government — to make the most effective use of available expertise and capability. We in OSC focus on comparative advantage: If we find an organization or company that can do something particularly well — for example, translations — we will leverage that advantage to the extent we can, allowing us then to focus our resources on what we do best.”
OSINT has always been an important part of all-source analysis, but continuing advances in information technology have given a voice to even larger numbers of people and made it possible to address new intelligence questions.
“For example, open sources can tell us how various groups overseas react to a speech by the president,” Naquin said. “We don’t have to settle for the ‘official’ view but can assess various groups’ perceptions as well as track trends over time.”
“Just because open source is ‘free’ or publicly available doesn’t mean it is easy,” Naquin added. To filter, understand, and analyze the enormous amount of material that comes into OSC 24/7, Open Source Officers (OSO) must be fluent in foreign languages, sensitive to cultural nuances, experts in their field, whether video, geospatial tools, media analysis or library science.
“If a government changes its stance toward the United States, an analyst with a thorough understanding of the language and familiarity with the culture might not only be able to forecast this change but can tell us why,” Naquin said. “The ability to combine foreign language skill, cultural knowledge, and advanced search techniques is not common.”
Policymakers and other government officials also rely on that expertise to gain a good picture of countries they plan to visit.
“They want to know the environment and various players before they visit,” Naquin said. “Not just guidebook information, but details that will help make their visits fruitful. It’s surprising what one can find in open sources if one knows where to look.”
OSC makes most of the information it collects and processes available both to the Intelligence Community and to the entire U.S. Government. Beyond making this “raw” data available to their all-source counterparts, OSC analysts identify and flag for others new insights or trends from open sources.
An experienced OSO is attuned to changes in tone, word choice, and syntax in official messages from foreign governments and organizations. Comparisons with past statements can provide insights into how the foreign actors view an incident or issue. The analysis can also help identify their “hot buttons” or “red lines."
As with all intelligence disciplines, OSINT has its challenges. The sheer volume is daunting, and separating wheat from chaff requires skill, knowledge, and a reliance on sophisticated information technology. It also takes a concerted effort to coordinate with partners to avoid duplication and make the best use of resources, but the payoff in both effectiveness and efficiency is high.
“As I look back over the past couple of years, we’ve made more significant contributions than even I would have anticipated,” Naquin said. “We work, however, at the convergence of the two most dynamic industries: media and information technology. It’s like being in a kayak going downstream at the fork of two rivers; the ride will be challenging, but if you have the skill, it’s also going to be good.”
The Internet, of course, has revolutionized the open source environment. Naquin expects that trend to continue.
“An organization that invests in open source today is akin to an individual who invested in Google in its first year. OSINT has always been an integral component in intelligence, but in five years, I believe the value proposition can only increase. An organization with an appreciation for OSINT’s value and potential will be the most effective in the future.”
If you believe you have the background and skills to work with the Open Source Center, you can see currently available positions here.
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With the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States entered World War II. In June 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – the forerunner of today’s CIA — to collect and analyze strategic information and to conduct espionage and special operations. For the first time in U.S. history, the nation had in the OSS a single intelligence service engaged in all basic secret activities: espionage, covert action, propaganda, and counterintelligence.
The following article is the third in a series that will explore the different branches of the Office of Strategic Services. This article focuses on the Morale Operations Branch.
As tensions rose in Europe during the early 1940s, President Roosevelt sent William J. Donovan to England to meet with British officials and learn about their intelligence organizations. Upon seeing the success of the first fact-finding mission, President Roosevelt sent Donovan to the Mediterranean and Middle East.
When Donovan returned, he was convinced that the Nazis were more advanced than the Allies in their ability to wage psychological warfare. He even wrote a publication arguing that the United States needed an organization to identify and counter Axis propaganda. Donovan implored President Roosevelt to establish an American organization similar to the British intelligence agencies.
At Donovan’s urging, in 1941 President Roosevelt established the Coordinator of Information, which included a propaganda organization — the Foreign Information Service (FIS). However, Donovan and FIS Director Robert Sherwood disagreed over propaganda messages and little was accomplished. When the OSS was created in 1942, FIS separated and became the Office of War Information.
Free from arguments over propaganda content, Donovan formed the Morale Operations (MO) Branch on March 3, 1943.
Psychological warfare involves the use of different kinds of propaganda: white, black, and sometimes, grey. White propaganda openly identifies the source and uses gentle persuasion and public relation techniques. Black propaganda is misinformation that identifies itself with one side of a conflict, but is truly produced by another opposing side. Grey propaganda is the most mysterious of all because the source of the propaganda is never identified.
The purpose of the MO Branch was to produce and distribute “black” or undercover propaganda campaigns against the Axis Powers.
The Morale Operations Branch was divided into five sections, including:
When the OSS was established in 1942, people from all experiences and backgrounds were recruited from military personnel to civilians. By 1944, the MO employed about 400 people around the world.
Morale Operations officers were trained in propaganda basics, including:
One of the MO Branch’s first significant efforts consisted of rumor campaigns. Rumors were often short, memorable stories concerning famous people and events that would appeal to the emotions. They were meant to cause fear, confusion, and distrust. For example, some of the rumors stated that high-level Nazi leaders had been captured or had surrendered to the Allies.
OSS and the Political Warfare Executive — the British MO equivalent — created and approved about 20 rumors per week; these rumors were then distributed by word of mouth, radio, or leaflet. The MO measured their success by keeping track of “comebacks,” or mentions of these rumors in foreign, neutral, or Allied press. According to OSS tallies of “comebacks,” rumors were especially effective.
Operation HEMLOCK was one the most successful and interesting OSS poison-pen letter campaigns. Anonymous letters were sent to the Gestapo implicating alleged Allied sympathizers or threatening to assassinate traitors. Additional letters were sent to the families of German servicemen in the form of death notices. These letters implied that their deceased family member had been killed by a lack of medical treatment or malpractice. The purpose of these letters was to intimidate collaborators, terrorize civilians, and harass the Gestapo.
MO agents in Italy developed a campaign called Wie Lange Noch? (How much longer?). The propaganda — identifiable by a red circle and three fingers forming a “W” — was distributed throughout Italy, southern France, and the Balkans.
The leaflets contained anti-German propaganda meant to make Europeans in Axis-controlled territory resentful of the Nazis.
This was one of the larger operations, with more than 130,000 leaflets printed and dispersed in June 1944 alone.
Another example of a successful MO project was SKORPION WEST — named after the German propaganda team in France.
After the defeats in Normandy, German morale took a dive. In order to raise spirits, the German propaganda team began writing optimistic leaflets, which were airdropped over their own lines.
The MO Branch produced “black” versions of these leaflets, which were such good forgeries that SKORPION WEST gave up and denounced all their previous publications as fakes.
The MO Branch found that the radio was another successful way to distribute their propaganda and reach a large audience. In June 1943, the first MO program was broadcast to Italy from Tunisia.
After this initial success, more and more “black” radio stations began popping up. In 1944, Soldatensender was created as a “grey” propaganda station, meaning its source was never identified. The program was transmitted from England and delivered news, music and entertainment to civilians. Mixed in with the entertainment were propaganda messages denouncing the Nazis. It quickly became the most popular MO station of WWII.
Several celebrities volunteered to participate in these “black” radio programs. In particular, Bing Crosby and Marlene Dietrich performed “black” lyrics written for German and American songs.
In addition to providing great entertainment, Soldatensender broadcast the names of Germans involved with the July 20, 1944, coup attempt against Hitler. The MO Branch’s intentions were to cast suspicion on as many people as possible and in the process, eliminate capable high-ranking Germans. The Gestapo took these accusations very seriously and arrested and eventually executed some 2,500 Germans.
While the operations the MO Branch had to remain secret and in the shadows, they made an impact on the war and succeeded in demoralizing Germany and its allies.
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The Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) is known for creating advanced technology to help support missions and protect our nation. A lot of this technology must remain secret. However, sometimes the CIA develops a technology that may benefit the public and decides to release the discovery.
The following is the first article in a series that will explore DS&T technology that has made an impact on the public. This article will focus on the lithium-iodine battery and the contributions this technology made to the medical community.
In the middle of the Cold War, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John A. McCone realized that the CIA needed a technological edge over the Soviet Union. In 1963, McCone established the Directorate of Science and Technology. Its purpose was to use science and technology in new and innovative ways to help protect the nation.
One of the DS&T’s first projects was the development of the lithium-iodine battery. The new battery would be used to improve the reliability and longevity of some technical operations.
The idea surrounding the lithium-iodine battery was to create a power source that could provide a long-duration, high density energy supply in a small package.
In the early 1960s, both the private and public sectors were experimenting with creating batteries using lithium as the anode material. The breakthrough in the chemistry was adding the iodine into the equation.
In order to do this, the iodine which sublimes (easily evaporates) at room temperature was mixed with a polymer to make it easier to use and create a charge transfer complex which would be electrically conductive. The end result was a material that could be made into a cathode — an electrode through which electric current flows out a polarized electric device.
Lithium-iodine batteries as produced commercially are used very reliably in applications requiring low currents i.e., microamps. The reliability of the lithium-iodine cell made it the power source of choice for long term applications requiring low currents.
In the early 1960s, the Agency shared the lithium-iodine battery concept with the public. A company working on an exploratory project developed and patented the first lithium-iodine battery for commercial use in 1968.
Meanwhile, in Buffalo, NY, Wilson Greatbatch was working diligently to develop the first cardiac pacemaker that could safely regulate a human heartbeat. He succeeded and patented his creation in 1962. Next, Greatbatch had to find a suitable power source for his new invention. He found his answer in the lithium-iodine battery.
Isaac, a senior scientist at the CIA, explains the significance of the two events, “Greatbatch recognized the value of the lithium-iodine technology and proposed using it as the power source in the cardiac pacemaker. The breakthrough was the long battery life that lithium-iodine could provide to power the pacemaker.”
The first pacemaker using a lithium-iodine battery was introduced and implanted in a patient in 1972.
Today, the lithium-iodine battery is the most common type of battery used in pacemakers because of its reliability and life span. Most lithium-iodine batteries can last 10 years or longer in a cardiac pacemaker.
What makes lithium-iodine batteries even more valuable in cardiac pacemakers is that when the battery nears the end of its life, the voltage begins to decrease. Because of the battery’s decreasing voltage, electrical designers can design an end of life indicator for the pacemaker that allows the device to inform the doctor a new battery is needed. The battery can then be changed safely before it completely discharges.
Lithium-iodine batteries can also be used for other medical applications, including:
In the 1980s, the Agency sought to improve the lithium-iodine battery by increasing its rate capability from microamps to milliamps. They were successful, but the new battery was considerably more expensive.
“The medical community already had a lithium-iodine battery that worked beautifully for the pacemaker,” Isaac said. “If they introduced a new version of the battery, they would need to run a lot of tests to ensure that it’s a 10-year battery. That could take a long time. The current lithium-iodine battery used in cardiac pacemakers is here to stay, that is, unless they come up with something that lasts for 20 years.”
Isaac recognizes the value of sharing Agency innovations with the public. “If national security is not compromised, we have an obligation as a government agency to share our discoveries, especially if it will benefit the public,” he said. “It’s important to give back. Sometimes our advancements that we share may even create jobs for U.S. citizens.”
To learn more about Agency innovations, visit the Science & Technology section.
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Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon E. Panetta on Confirmation of James Clapper as DNI
August 6, 2010
The confirmation of Jim Clapper as Director of National Intelligence is good news for the men and women of the community he now leads and the country we all strive to protect. Given the variety and complexity of the security challenges we face, the sound integration of America's intelligence capabilities is an absolute necessity. As he works to accomplish that mission, Jim's experience, clear vision, and practical approach to management will be powerful assets.
I know Jim well, and I have seen his complete commitment to the task of defending our nation and his deep dedication to those who carry out that task. On behalf of the officers of the Central Intelligence Agency, I congratulate Jim on his confirmation and welcome him to this newest assignment in a long and distinguished career of public service.
Leon E. Panetta
U.S., Pakistani Forces Collaborate to Help Flood Victims
Fri, 13 Aug 2010 15:00:00 -0500
U.S., Pakistani Forces Collaborate to Help Flood VictimsBy Ian Graham WASHINGTON, Aug. 13, 2010 - The flood in Pakistan has caused unprecedented damage and left millions of people across the country homeless. The problem is beyond comprehension, and international support groups, including the U.S. military, are doing what they can to help. Army Brig. Gen. Michael Nagata, deputy commander of the U.S. defense representative's office in Pakistan, joined a "DoD Live" bloggers roundtable today to discuss the details and operational aspects of ongoing U.S. military flood relief operations in Pakistan's Swat Valley. In response to an urgent request from the Pakistani government for helicopter support, six helicopters from the 3rd Infantry Division's 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade deployed from Afghanistan Aug. 4 to Ghazi Air Base in Pakistan. Since then, they have been shuttling food and other supplies to refugees and rescuing stranded victims. The flood has killed more than 1,600 people and submerged massive portions of the country. "The magnitude of this disaster is beyond anything anyone was prepared for, in Pakistan or across the world," Nagata said. "No one can remember a flood this bad, which had such far-reaching consequences. We have to rise to the level of damage and harm this disaster is causing." Reports have come out of Pakistan estimating that the scale of the flood may outpace the disastrous tsunami that destroyed so much in Southeast Asia in 2004. Though the death toll is on par with recent natural disasters, United Nations officials estimate that 13.8 million people will need aid in the aftermath. Though the Army's four CH-47 Chinook and two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters and their aircrews have delivered more than 160 metric tons of supplies and rescued more than 3,000 people, the Ghazi contingent has been hampered by rain in the valley. "Weather is certainly a factor," Nagata said. "Of the available flying days we've had, we've only been able to effectively fly about half that time." The Swat Valley hasn't had to face the same issues other parts of the country are dealing with, especially concerns over waterborne disease. While flooding in the lowlands of Pakistan has left massive amounts of standing water – breeding grounds for bacteria as well as infectious-disease-carrying insects – the water in Swat is moving very rapidly. Nagata said the big concern there is getting to people who have been stranded, because bridges and roadways were washed away so quickly. Should health concerns become a bigger issue, Nagata said, U.S. medical personnel assigned to Ghazi, as well as the entire medical corps of the Pakistani military, will handle it. International organizations also may play a role if disease becomes a critical issue. Some media have speculated about concerns of Taliban activity in the region, as one of Pakistan's recent major military offensives against the extremist group was focused in Swat. Nagata said he hasn't seen any evidence of extremist activity, but noted he's paying more attention to relief efforts and allowing Pakistan to handle security issues. "What fills our radar screen is the urgent need to get support to the people," the general said. "We're not here to conduct anything but disaster response and relief." Today, two Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters and a Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopter from the Peleliu Amphibious Ready Group and 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in Pakistan as part of the continued U.S. humanitarian assistance to Pakistan in support of flood relief efforts. The three aircraft are part of the contingent of 19 helicopters ordered to Pakistan this week by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. The aircraft flew into Pakistan from aboard the USS Peleliu, which is positioned in international waters in the Arabian Sea. They will join two other CH-53E helicopters that arrived at Ghazi yesterday, bringing to five the total number of aircraft in Pakistan from the USS Peleliu. The remaining aircraft will arrive over the next few days and will include two more Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters and 12 Marine Corps CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters. The U.S. helicopters will operate in partnership with the Pakistan military throughout the country's flood-affected areas. The 19 aircraft will relieve the six U.S. Army helicopters, which will soon return to duty in Afghanistan. The total U.S. military presence in Pakistan, Nagata estimated, is a few hundred servicemembers, all of whom are there at the invitation and request of the Pakistani government. Nagata emphasized the U.S. commitment to helping Pakistan recover from the disaster and praised the courage of Pakistanis during this difficult time. "We will be here so long as the government of Pakistan requests and requires our assistance," the general said. "This is an enormous disaster. The people of Pakistan are courageously battling against the elements to get to people in need, repair bridges, and help their fellow Pakistanis who are in distress. Whatever we can do to get to those people in distress to support our Pakistani counterparts is well worth doing, and we're proud to be here." U.S. military support to Pakistan is just one piece of a much broader U.S. government response. The United States has pledged to provide about $76 million in assistance to flood-affected populations in Pakistan, which includes both financial assistance and the immediate provision of urgently needed supplies and services, drawing on unique U.S. capabilities and resources. Since the floods began on July 29, the United States has contributed: -- A month's ration of food to about 181,000 people through the partnership with the World Food Program; -- Humanitarian contributions that include $11.25 million for the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees and $5 million for International Committee of the Red Cross, bringing the total U.S. commitment to about $76 million to expand existing emergency programs in all flood-affected parts of Pakistan; -- $3 million to the World Health Organization for the expansion of Pakistan's disease early warning system (and to establish the first 15 treatment centers for water-borne illness in high-risk flood-affected areas; -- $4.1 million to Save the Children for food vouchers that enable flood victims to purchase food in their local markets; -- Through yesterday, U.S. helicopters assigned to the Pakistani interior ministry's 50th Squadron rescued 1,019 people, airlifted 78,473 pounds of supplies and engaged in other support missions; -- More than 1,100 rolls of plastic sheeting and 14,000 blankets, which arrived in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad on Aug. 10 and will benefit about 11,100 families or 66,000 people once they're transported to Punjab province for distribution; -- A total of 436,944 meals delivered via U.S. Air Force airlift to civilian and military officials in Pakistan, a contribution of about $3.7 million; -- Emergency relief items delivered to the National Disaster Management Authority in Peshawar, including 18 rescue boats, six water filtration units, 10 water storage bladders and 30 concrete-cutting saws valued at $746,000; and -- Twelve prefabricated steel bridges, valued at $3.2 million, made available as temporary replacements for highway bridges damaged by flooding and a 25-kilowatt generator costing about $30,000. |
| Related Sites: Special Report: U.S. Provides Support During Pakistan Flooding "DoD Live" Bloggers Roundtable CIA Factbook: Pakistan |
Every day CIA employees risk their lives to keep the nation safe. Some make the ultimate sacrifice and give their lives for the mission. On the smooth, white marble walls of the CIA Original Headquarters Building lobby a field of stars serves as a somber, silent memorial for fallen CIA officers.
Learn more about the Agency’s tributes to its heroes in the CIA’s new Memorial Wall publication. The Office of Public Affairs produces publications like Memorial Wall to inform the public about the Agency and its mission.
The Memorial Wall publication explores the history of the Memorial Wall, the Book of Honor, and the annual Memorial Service. Readers will learn about who receives a star and about the master stone carver who designed the memorial and the current stone carver who continues the work. In this publication, readers experience how the Agency honors those officers who have given their lives to defend our nation.
A printable version of the Memorial Wall publication is available on the website so readers can share it with friends and family.
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—Director George J. Tenet
May 2004
The men and women of CIA are united by a mission essential to our country. They act as a team, often living overseas and working long hours to help our nation meet difficult security challenges. When an officer dies in the line of duty, it is only fitting that there be a place to remember and pay tribute to that colleague, and friend. For the people of CIA, that is the Memorial Wall. It is dedicated to those we have lost and it is a lasting reminder of their heroism, the risks inherent in the intelligence profession, and our pledge to put service before self. The Wall—and the stories of the people it commemorates—inspire all who carry the mission forward. It affirms our own commitment to the American people.
“We at CIA remember our heroes—the men and women commemorated by stars on our Memorial Wall. Each of them, in their own way and own time, strengthened America and helped spread freedom across the globe.”
—Director Leon E. Panetta
June 2009
The men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) work around the clock and around the globe to make the United States more secure. We put Country first and Agency before self. We are dedicated to the mission; we take the necessary risks to obtain the information our country needs to protect itself in a dangerous world.
It is important to reflect on how few stars appear on the CIA Memorial Wall, given the role the Agency plays as the nation’s forward line of defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go. Our officers are frequently first on the ground in areas of unrest, often without the benefit of additional support, always in harm’s way.

We honor those Agency officers who have come before us.
“The Americans commemorated by these stars came from all walks of life. They heard the call to duty and chose to serve in an agency unlike any other. Quiet patriotism was their hallmark. They would advance freedom and build a better world, not for public acclaim, but because it is the right thing to do.”
—Director Michael V. Hayden
May 2008
The stars carved in marble in CIA’s Headquarters Lobby are a simple, silent memorial to employees who have died in the line of duty. The inscription above the stars reads, “In honor of those members of the Central Intelligence Agency who gave their lives in the service of their country.” Those remembered with stars performed every aspect of the Agency’s mission, from covert action and collection to analysis, support and technical capabilities. They came from every Directorate, either as staff officers or contractors. They served in every corner of the world, many of them in war zones and other places of great danger. They worked against every national security challenge faced by the United States since CIA’s founding in 1947. The men and women came from a variety of backgrounds reflecting America’s rich diversity. While many had years of service, others were young; the youngest was 21 at the time of her death.
Not every fallen employee receives a star. The CIA’s Honor and Merit Awards Board will recommend that the CIA Director approve a star if the nomination meets specific and current criteria:
Once the Director endorses a nomination, the Office of Protocol arranges placement of the star on the Memorial Wall.
“The stars on the Memorial Wall are to us more than symbols, more than history. They are a priceless part of who we are. They are the colleagues and leaders who define us—in dedication and in sacrifice. It is in this new century their mission we seek to accomplish. And it is their commitment of which we seek to be worthy.”
—Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin
June 2001
In February 1973, Agency officers proposed that a memorial plaque be placed at CIA Headquarters to honor employees who had died in Southeast Asia, primarily in Laos and Vietnam. The Honor and Merit Board expanded the concept to recognize all CIA officers who had fallen in the line of duty. Agency officer Edward Ryan, then Chairman of the CIA’s Fine Arts Commission, met with a representative from the American Foreign Service Association to discuss the criteria used for the Memorial Plaques in the lobby of the US Department of State. Later, the US Commission of Fine Arts recommended Master Stone Carver Harold Vogel to design the CIA Memorial. Vogel had extensive experience—including having carved the lettering on the marble walls at The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.
Vogel’s design inspiration for the Memorial Wall came from the Bauhaus style—a modernist concept also known as the International Style—which is marked by the absence of ornamentation and by harmony between the function of an object and its design. Vogel’s goal was to make the memory of the fallen an integral part of the building which, to many, represents the Agency’s mission. His vision of the CIA’s Memorial emphasized the unity of the stars on the wall, standing as a field.
His concept was approved in November 1973 and the original 31 stars were approved by Director William E. Colby in April 1974. Three months later, Vogel carved the Memorial. It was done without fanfare. No ceremony was held; no pictures were taken—the stars and inscription simply appeared.
“When we move on—whether to another chapter in our careers or our lives—we never lose the distinct sense of pride in belonging to such a storied and exceptional organization. Nor do we ever forget having been in the company of such remarkably talented men and women, especially those we honor today, whose deeds are immortal. We see, in our mind’s eye, these deep-cut stars engraved in marble, and we know that we always will be part of something noble and worthy.”
—Director Porter J. Goss
May 2006
“When Harold Vogel designed the original wall, it was not intended for the large number of stars that appear today. It is a very sad thought, all those sacrifices.”
—Tim Johnston
Stone Carver
Master Stone Carver Harold Vogel was born in Detroit, Michigan to an immigrant family from Ansbach, Germany. After the stock market crashed in 1929, the family returned to their home town in Bavaria and the family business—stone quarries and carving. During his formative years, he spent a great deal of time with his grandfather, a restoration sculptor, who taught Vogel how to use a hammer and chisel. In 1945, he began a stone carving apprenticeship in Nuremberg, and, after receiving his master craftsman certificate, came back to the United States and volunteered to serve in the US Army. Vogel eventually settled in Washington, DC and studied at the Corcoran School of Art (now The Corcoran College of Art + Design) and George Washington University. Vogel worked on the National Cathedral, the US Capitol building, and completed all the lettering on the marble walls of The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.
Stone Carver Tim Johnston learned his craft as an apprentice to Vogel. Johnston watched Vogel carve stars on the Memorial Wall for several years before he was allowed to carve a star with his own hand in 1989.
Johnston was born in Denver, Colorado. His father worked for the Department of Agriculture and moved to Northern Virginia in 1966 when Johnston was a young boy. At the age of 12, Johnston began working during the summers in the marble and tile industry. After graduating from high school, he worked full time for a tile company, but his interests shifted to stone setting, and finally, stone carving.
The Memorial Wall is a bittersweet project for Johnston. He is proud to help recognize CIA’s mission and the sacrifices made by Agency officers on behalf of the nation. Yet each time he must come to CIA, he does so with a heavy heart aware that an officer has fallen.
Johnston uses Vogel’s original 1974 template—which, when not in use, is locked in a safe—to ensure that every star is the same. Each one is first drawn by hand; the carving itself takes about one hour. Each star measures 2¼ inches tall by 2¼ inches wide and half an inch deep; the stars are six inches apart from each other, as are the rows. Johnston uses both a pneumatic air hammer and a chisel to carve out the traced pattern. After he finishes carving the star, he cleans the dust and sprays the star dark gray, which with age, acquires its own patina.
Johnston approaches his task with exceptional care. He describes the experience in his own words: “I only have one shot to carve the star—marble is unpredictable, you can never be sure how it will act—it’s a scary situation. But at the same time it’s a fantastic thing to do.”
For pictures of the stone carvers at work, click here.
“The stars are what made this country great and their names should be in a Memorial book, not as signage on the wall.”
—Harold Vogel
Master Stone Carver
The Book of Honor—on display in front of the Memorial Wall at all times—contains the names of employees who died while serving their country. Each is next to a 23-carat gold leaf star. For reasons of security—to protect intelligence sources and methods—the names of some of those on the Wall must remain secret, even in death. Each of these officers is remembered in the book by a gold star alone.
Part of Vogel’s concept for the Memorial Wall included a display case to house the Book of Honor. The cover of the book, never seen by the public, displays a 22-carat gold embossed Agency seal. Vogel selected Levant leather—from Morocco—with a soft pebble-grain texture commonly found in fine book binding. The inside cover is light tan silk end sheets. The original book is small in size, 25 inches x 9 inches. Sadly, by 2004, the 83rd star had been added to the original book and it was poignantly apparent that a larger book and case were required. Vogel and his apprentice, Johnston, designed and built the current case out of Carrara marble (measuring 36 inches x 22 ½ inches), leaving a resting place for the original book to lie underneath.
The second book is almost double the size of the original, but in all other ways an exact duplicate. The outside of the book is 20 inches x 32 inches and the page size is 18 inches x 29 ¾ inches. The Arches paper—selected for its high archival quality and calligraphy receptive surface—has rough, deckled edges typical of handmade paper.
The book is a work of art thanks to the skill of a professional calligrapher—a CIA employee—who writes each name and draws each star. She uses a dip pen, not a fountain pen; black sumi ink is used for its ease and glossy finish; a Mitchell round hand square nib, size three and a half, is reserved exclusively for the book; the gold stars are hand drawn with a Gillott number 303 nib; the shell gold is made in France from a hundred-year-old recipe. The stars are polished using an agate burnisher.
The style of lettering was selected by the calligrapher for its functionality and readability. “The importance is in the names, not the lettering,” she said.
When a star is added to the Wall, the Book of Honor is updated concurrently.
For more pictures of the Book of Honor, click here.
“Ceremonies that honor the dead are, in truth, for the living. They remind us of our mortality but also celebrate the lives and memories of those we have loved, trusted and respected. Certainly, we mourn their loss—but we also glory in the knowledge of their extraordinary contribution to our service and to our country.”
—Deputy Director Robert M. Gates
May 1987
The first annual Memorial Ceremony was held in 1987, 13 years after the Memorial Wall was created. The suggestion to hold a yearly commemoration came from an Agency officer. The idea came to him after he showed his son the Memorial Wall.
At the time of the first ceremony, the Agency was in its 40th year and there were 50 stars on the wall. Deputy Director Robert M. Gates presided. It was a simple event, attended by a small number of Agency officers. The officer who made the suggestion to hold a ceremony said, “…having been born abroad, in a communist country at that, my small contribution to this memorial meeting makes me especially proud of being an officer of this great Agency.”
Each year since then, the Agency has gathered to remember its fallen in a solemn setting closed to the public. Though the themes of the service and sacrifice are constant, the event has changed over the years:
The Memorial Ceremony is one of the largest annual events at CIA. It is open only to Agency employees and the family members of our fallen officers.
The ceremony is held in the Headquarters lobby in the late morning. It begins with the audience standing for the presentation of colors by the CIA Honor Guard, the National Anthem, and an invocation or opening prayer.
The Director of the CIA typically presides over the event and delivers remarks. Those comments highlight the sacrifices made by Agency officers in defense of this nation and often profile specific individuals honored with a memorial star. The names of the fallen are then read by four senior Agency officers, representing each Directorate. Following the roll call, a wreath is placed before the Wall. The ceremony concludes with a benediction and the playing of “Taps.”
For more pictures of the memorial ceremony, click here.
The design for the Memorial Wall is approved—a memorial dedicated to Agency employees who lost their lives in the line of duty.
Master Stone Carver Harold Vogel carves 31 stars into marble at CIA Headquarters.
First annual Memorial Ceremony is held.
First time non-Agency family members of the fallen are invited to attend the Ceremony.
First time all the names on the Wall are read aloud regardless of cover status.
The family of each fallen officer receives a replica of a memorial star.
During the height of the Cold War, America’s policymakers were concerned about the likelihood of a surprise nuclear attack from the USSR. Soviet atomic and space advances intensified their fears. U.S. leaders needed hard information about Soviet capabilities to make sound foreign policy decisions. It was nearly impossible to penetrate the Iron Curtain and collect sufficient intelligence. Although the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft had provided imagery to dispel the alleged “Bomber Gap” in the late 1950s, the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 in May 1960 ended this collection program. Fortunately, the CIA in cooperation with private industry was developing a better, more secure, space-based collection system – the CORONA photoreconnaissance satellite.
The idea of the CORONA system was first broached in late 1957. The purpose of CORONA was to provide broad imagery coverage of the USSR to identify missile launch sites and production facilities. President Dwight D. Eisenhower formally endorsed the project in February 1958.
Only a top-notch team could make such a great achievement possible in so little time. Three organizations were involved in the CORONA project, including:
The head of the CIA project branch was Dr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Planning and Development. U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Osmund Ridland served as the lead for the Air Force project branch. The industry team consisted of Lockheed Space Systems, Itek Corporation, General Electric, and many more.
By February 1959, the CORONA was ready for a test drive. Unfortunately, its first mission was a failure. From 1959 to 1960, CORONA experienced 13 failed mission attempts. The CIA, Air Force, and industry endured and kept trying through all the disappointments.
Their persistence paid off. The first successful recovery of film from space occurred on August 18, 1960. It took less than two years to get to this point.
CORONA’s first successful flight certainly made its mark in history by:
In its debut, the CORONA acquired more overhead photographic coverage than all of the U-2 flights over the USSR to that date.
CORONA also accomplished a number of firsts, including:
What did all of this new intelligence tell policymakers? That the Soviets had greatly exaggerated their military capabilities. There was, indeed, a missile gap, but it was sharply in favor of the United States.
From then on, there was an explosion of intelligence data. In fact, CORONA’s success profoundly altered the course of the Cold War and was probably instrumental in keeping the United States back from the nuclear threshold.
From the beginning, the CORONA project was classified and known only to the public as the U.S. Air Force’s Discoverer program. In February 1995, with approval from President Bill Clinton, the project was finally declassified and shared with the public.
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August 18, 2010
Director Leon E. Panetta has announced the creation of CIA’s Counterproliferation Center (CPC). This new unit will combine operational and analytic specialists dedicated to combating the spread of dangerous weapons and technology, allowing for even greater collaboration and information sharing on a top intelligence priority.
Building on the success of proven models, such as CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, the new organization will incorporate the current Counterproliferation Division of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) and elements of the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation & Arms Control Center (WINPAC), which is part of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI).
Director Panetta said that more DI analysts and NCS officers will work side-by-side in the center, providing “precise, comprehensive” analytical support to operations. “As our nation continues to confront the threat of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological,” Director Panetta noted, “we must constantly strive for new ways to work across directorates, combining a diversity of expertise with a range of powerful capabilities to keep our nation safe. Our greatest achievements as an agency are the product of close collaboration among operations officers, analysts, targeters, technical specialists, and support officers.”
The Counterproliferation Center will be led by an undercover NCS officer, with deputies for operations and analysis. Director Panetta explained that CPC would take shape over the next several weeks. “More important than the movement of people or desks, though, are the results we seek: the strongest, most effective counterproliferation operations and analysis in our Agency’s history,” Director Panetta said.
During the height of the Cold War, America’s policymakers were concerned about the likelihood of a surprise nuclear attack from the USSR. Soviet atomic and space advances intensified their fears. U.S. leaders needed hard information about Soviet capabilities to make sound foreign policy decisions. It was nearly impossible to penetrate the Iron Curtain and collect sufficient intelligence. Although the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft had provided imagery to dispel the alleged “Bomber Gap” in the late 1950s, the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 in May 1960 ended this collection program. Fortunately, the CIA in cooperation with private industry was developing a better, more secure, space-based collection system – the CORONA photoreconnaissance satellite.
The idea of the CORONA system was first broached in late 1957. The purpose of CORONA was to provide broad imagery coverage of the USSR to identify missile launch sites and production facilities. President Dwight D. Eisenhower formally endorsed the project in February 1958.
Only a top-notch team could make such a great achievement possible in so little time. Three organizations were involved in the CORONA project, including:
The head of the CIA project branch was Dr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Planning and Development. U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Osmund Ridland served as the lead for the Air Force project branch. The industry team consisted of Lockheed Space Systems, Itek Corporation, General Electric, and many more.
By February 1959, the CORONA was ready for a test drive. Unfortunately, its first mission was a failure. From 1959 to 1960, CORONA experienced 13 failed mission attempts. The CIA, Air Force, and industry endured and kept trying through all the disappointments.
Their persistence paid off. The first successful recovery of film from space occurred on August 18, 1960. It took less than two years to get to this point.
CORONA’s first successful flight certainly made its mark in history by:
In its debut, the CORONA acquired more overhead photographic coverage than all of the U-2 flights over the USSR to that date.
CORONA also accomplished a number of firsts, including:
What did all of this new intelligence tell policymakers? That the Soviets had greatly exaggerated their military capabilities. There was, indeed, a missile gap, but it was sharply in favor of the United States.
From then on, there was an explosion of intelligence data. In fact, CORONA’s success profoundly altered the course of the Cold War and was probably instrumental in keeping the United States back from the nuclear threshold.
From the beginning, the CORONA project was classified and known only to the public as the U.S. Air Force’s Discoverer program. In February 1995, with approval from President Bill Clinton, the project was finally declassified and shared with the public.
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The president and policymakers rely on insights from Central Intelligence Agency products to help form their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the second in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article focuses on signals intelligence.
Communication is an important part of everyday life; especially when it comes to leading a country. World leaders communicate with their people in a variety of ways. All of these forms of communication emit a signal that can be collected. The information gathered from these intercepted signals is of vital importance to national security.
The Intelligence Community refers to the collection and exploitation of signals transmitted from communication systems, radars, and weapon systems as signals intelligence (SIGINT).
SIGINT consists of:
SIGINT is collected in a variety of ways depending on the type of signal targeted. NSA collects the raw SIGINT and then NSA translators, cryptologists, analysts, and other technical experts turn the raw data into something that an all-source analyst can use.
Once the NSA has collected, processed, and analyzed SIGINT, it is passed on to CIA and Intelligence Community analysts who use it to complement information from other sources to produce finished intelligence.
The volume and variety of today’s signals adds challenges to the timely production of finished intelligence for policymakers. It is a lot of work to track and analyze all the SIGINT collected.
SIGINT is one of the most useful sources of information and can often provide a new and different perspective on a critical intelligence topic for the nation’s policymakers.
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Despite its portrayal in the movies, working at the Central Intelligence Agency isn’t glamour and danger all the time. In fact, for most officers, it’s more like a normal 9-to-5 job. This story is the first in a series that will debunk certain myths and misperceptions about working at the CIA.
Meet Brad, Chris, Larry, and Eleanor — all experienced CIA officers with time spent overseas. In this article, they’ll share their insights and do their best to debunk myths about being an Agency employee.
The mere mention of the CIA brings to mind fancy sports cars like Maxwell Smart’s shiny red Sunbeam Tiger roadster armed with weapons and fancy gadgets. However, the average CIA officer drives a much less exciting vehicle to work — if they are even allowed a vehicle overseas at all — and it certainly isn’t armed.
Brad: “Agency-assigned cars help us blend in wherever we are assigned. They are to help us get our work done. We don’t want to be flashy because we need to blend into the background unnoticed. One of my favorite cars was a compact that would sound the horn if the battery got wet. This required some quick repairs so I wouldn’t announce my path on my way to meet a contact during a heavy rainstorm.”
Chris: “On one assignment, I had to share my car, so I ended up taking public transportation a lot.”
Larry: “During one nine-year tour, I never had a car. Public transportation and walking were the norm in the country.”
Eleanor: “A lot of places in which we operate do not have HOV lanes, valet parking or very reliable traffic regulations. You won’t get very far on pock-marked roads if you’re driving a Lamborghini, never mind finding a garage that will be able to make repairs to it. We’re more likely to drive cars that are practical for the rough environments in which we operate, and one that will not draw the attention of the locals.”
In addition to flashy transportation, a good spy story features cities and countries around the globe. Sydney Bristow of “Alias” fame often traveled from France to Moscow and back to the United States all in one episode. The majority of our officers work in the United States. For officers who have the opportunity to travel a lot, it can be exciting, but the novelty soon wears off.
Eleanor: “The CIA has some fantastic opportunities to see the world from a unique perspective. Despite all the conflict that fuels the reason for this job, I am constantly reminded that the world is a beautiful place. If you’re the kind of person who finds yourself homesick for some distant corner of the world, this is the job for you. I’ve learned that a challenge is much more fulfilling than glamour. During my travels, I often find that a meal at the local market is much more memorable and fulfilling than a meal at the fanciest restaurant in town.”
Chris: “At one point, I had 2.5 million frequent flier miles from traveling around the world over a period of about 10 years. Of all that flying, I flew in first-class one time on an upgrade.”
Larry: “Yes, the travel seems a bit glamorous at the beginning, but after a while, you begin dreading airport rituals. That said, I’ve had the opportunity to travel to some pretty exotic locations.”
And who can forget James Bond’s famous request for a “martini: shaken, not stirred” as he makes his way through a glamorous cocktail party while scoping out the bad guy? While socializing is necessary to complete the mission, most of a CIA officer’s time is spent building relationships, not at cocktail parties.
Brad: “Our work takes us to all types of places overseas. I’ve been to high-class events with the country’s elite. I’ve also interacted with the more humble parts. Some of my best and most memorable experiences were with foreign citizens who did not come from a privileged background. They were good, honest people that cared about others and the future of their countries. We didn’t sip champagne, but had heartfelt discussions over stale coffee.”
Chris: “I went to a lot of cocktail parties, and some of those might be described as glamorous if you squinted while looking around the room, but most of the individuals I was trying to meet had mustaches and pot bellies. Not a Bond girl in the bunch.”
Eleanor: “I used to think that case officers were supposed to be ‘things that go bump in the night’: stealthy, aloof, able to work a crowd but not get too close. In reality, you’ll never recruit anyone during a cocktail party because this job is all about personal connection.”
Agency officers may be portrayed as glamorous, adventure-seeking spies in the movies, but they’re really just ordinary people.
Brad: “I’m really just a regular guy with a family with a fairly typical life. My neighbors, high school buddies, and extended family would probably be shocked to know that my job is to recruit spies and to collect information that is crucial to protecting lives and to formulating national security policies. I don’t mind if they think I’m just a ‘paper shuffler.’ At the end of the day, I have the personal satisfaction of knowing that I am doing something to protect our nation.”
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From President Truman on, each president has written a note of thanks to the men and women of the CIA. These notes are displayed with the president’s official photograph in the Presidential Gallery of the New Headquarters Building. This story is the fourth in a series about the relationship each president has had with the CIA. This article will focus on President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953, he was no stranger to the value of intelligence. Eisenhower had experienced the profound power intelligence could have during his days as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in World War II. During Eisenhower’s tenure, the Cold War was at its height. Fortunately, advances in technology fostered by the CIA — such as the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and CORONA — allowed Eisenhower to peer behind the Iron Curtain.
In 1954, President Eisenhower authorized the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Its purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union and collect strategic intelligence. This mission was entrusted to the Central Intelligence Agency.
The CIA and Lockheed’s “Skunkworks” worked together to develop the U-2. It would be flown at subsonic speed by one pilot at altitudes of 65,000 to 70,000 feet. The U-2’s design allowed it to glide and stay aloft for more than eight hours. By 1956, the U-2 had been tested and was ready for its first flight over the Soviet Union.
Concerned by the potential for diplomatic conflict, and even war, that overflights of the Soviet Bloc could cause, Eisenhower reserved the right to approve missions himself. Eisenhower limited the number of missions to what he considered the minimum necessary to close vital intelligence gaps, which the photographs from the U-2 did with great success.
Soviet radars tracked most, if not all, U-2 flights over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but their missiles and fighters could not reach high enough to shoot the U-2 down. All the Soviets could do was to deliver protest notes to the United States, and push their developers for technological or tactical breakthroughs, while American developers tried in vain to make the U-2 invisible to radar. After many failures, the Soviets were able to get a missile close enough on May 1, 1960 when they shot down a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers.
At the Four-Power Summit in May 1960, Eisenhower said this about the U-2 project:
“It must be remembered that over a long period, these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation’s security. In fact, their success has been nothing short of remarkable.”
President Eisenhower endorsed the CORONA satellite project in February 1958.
The purpose of CORONA was to provide broad imagery coverage of the USSR to identify missile launch sites and production facilities.
The project was a joint effort between the CIA, U.S. Air Force, and private industry. The head of the CIA project branch was Dr. Richard M. Bissell Jr., the Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Planning and Development.
By February 1959, the CORONA was ready for a test. Unfortunately, its first mission was a failure. From 1959 to 1960, CORONA experienced 13 failed missions. In spite of these setbacks, the project team never gave up.
Their persistence paid off. The first successful recovery of film from space occurred on August 18, 1960. In its debut, the CORONA acquired more overhead photographic coverage than all of the U-2 flights over the USSR to that date.
Intelligence collected from the U-2 and CORONA projects showed that the Soviets had greatly exaggerated their military capabilities. There was, indeed, a missile gap, but it was sharply in favor of the United States.
President Eisenhower recognized the value of intelligence and organizations like the CIA. During the laying of the cornerstone for the Original Headquarters Building in 1959, Eisenhower paid tribute to Agency officers:
“By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness, and selflessness — to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be explained. In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism — their reward can be little except the conviction they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.”
Carrying on the tradition started by President Truman following the Agency’s founding, President Eisenhower wrote a note to the men and women of the CIA acknowledging their service to the United States. He is the second president to write a note for the CIA’s Presidents’ Gallery:
“FOR: THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
An indispensable organization to our country.”
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Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon E. Panetta on Remembering September 11th
September 10, 2010
Tomorrow, our country will remember the terrible day on which nearly 3,000 Americans were killed by terrorists. Because al-Qa’ida’s victims were innocent men, women, and children going about their daily lives; because the fanaticism and cruelty of the murderers were so vile; and because their hatred was aimed squarely at the values we stand for as a nation, September 11th, 2001 will forever be a defining moment for Americans. We will always grieve for those taken from us so violently. And we will both honor their memory and answer the enemy by showing our American character. We act justly and decisively against threats to our people, our freedom, and our nation.
That is our mission at CIA. We are entrusted with the high privilege and hard work of tracking down the terrorists who threaten our country. Al-Qa’ida recognizes no legal or moral constraints. We do, and can be especially proud of how we have answered the President’s call to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its allies.
With patience and skill, we have intensified the pressure on the terrorists by gaining greater access to their secrets, going after them in places they once considered safe, and keeping them on the run. Their objective is to take innocent lives—ours is to save them. By disrupting plots and targeting the terrorists with unprecedented accuracy, we protect our fellow citizens and uphold our values wherever we serve.
And it is our values, not blood or background, that ultimately define America and Americans. We are united by our shared belief in liberty, equality, tolerance, fairness, and better lives for our children. By these lights, we know who the enemy is, and why we fight them.
The enemy is defined not by any religion, but by their actions—their atrocities. They represent no culture, but rather contempt for all cultures. As the enemy demands brutal conformity, the United States embraces the world in its infinite variety. America itself is, after all, a nation of nations, the product of every faith and race. We can never forget that. With a system of government designed to keep us free, our people—brought together by choice and by principle—are what give our nation its character and place in the world.
Our Agency draws enormous strength from that fact. The diversity of talent that we send into the field against al-Qa’ida includes officers with roots in the countries and communities suffering and sacrificing on the front lines—Arabs and South Asians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. I see the powerful contributions they make by virtue of their knowledge, insight, and sheer courage. They are our brothers and sisters. I hope many more Americans like them will join us. We are one family, bound together by our values, our liberty, and our Constitution.
Protecting America is the work of all Americans. To defend the things we all hold dear takes teamwork, strength, and determination. That’s the best possible response to the terrorists who planned the attacks of nine years ago, and all who threaten our nation today. Drawing resolve from that tragedy, the men and women of this Agency pledge that we will never forget September 11th, and that we will continue to fight for the safety and freedom of the American people.
Leon E. Panetta
The CIA Museum is home to many interesting artifacts associated with the Central Intelligence Agency’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); foreign intelligence organizations; and the CIA itself. The following article is the fifth in a series that will explore the Agency’s amazing history through the artifacts in the CIA Museum. This article focuses on the escape and evasion map.
Imagine this:
A group of frightened and disheveled soldiers have just escaped from a German prison camp. The soldiers have never seen what lies outside the prison, yet they make their way quickly and quietly through the surrounding landscape to a safe house. Escape to safety may not have been possible without the silk map one of the soldiers carried.
During a war, there’s always the possibility of being captured by the enemy. Throughout history, American troops were told that if they were captured, it was their duty to escape and live to fight another day. This was no different during World War II; however, this time the soldiers had some help with escape and evasion tactics.
To evade and escape the enemy successfully, soldiers needed special training and supplies. The British were the first to address these needs. On Dec. 23, 1939, British Military Intelligence established MI9 to facilitate escape and evasion for British soldiers who found themselves in hostile territory. One invaluable tool MI9 created was the silk map.
An MI9 officer by the name of Clayton Hutton created the silk map. Hutton was known for being a determined, passionate go-getter. In 1940, Hutton met with famous Edinburgh mapmaker John Bartholomew. He obtained maps of Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and the Balkans. When Hutton told Bartholomew how he intended to use the maps, the mapmaker waived all copyrights in support of the war effort.
Hutton’s next task was to find a material on which to print the maps. He needed a fabric that met the following requirements:
The answer came in the fabric used to make parachutes: silk. However, the material was difficult to print on because the ink ran and smeared. Hutton was about to give up when he tried adding Pectin — a type of wax — to the ink, which prevented it from running or washing out in water. The maps and text were crystal clear.
Rayon, Nylon and a type of tissue paper made with mulberry leaves — all very durable — were also used to make maps.
In 1940, the British began issuing the silk escape and evasion maps to aircrews in case they were shot down over hostile territory. The maps were a great success and served many uses. Hutton called the maps “the escaper’s most important accessory.” They not only helped a soldier escape, but could protect him from the cold in Europe or swarms of mosquitoes in Burma.
When the United States entered World War II, it was very interested in the British intelligence organizations. In November 1942, a group of American intelligence officers visited MI9 to learn about escape and evasion methods. During their visit, they were shown the silk escape maps. Upon their return, Secretary of War Henry Stimson established an American equivalent of MI9 called MIS-X. The fledgling escape and evasion organization began producing its own silk maps.
The first U.S. escape and evasion map produced was a road map of West Africa printed on hot air balloon cloth in 1942. From then on, the maps were standard issue for American soldiers, including members of the OSS.
MIS-X and MI9 began working together to produce escape and evasion maps. It was agreed that MIS-X and MI9 would share responsibilities for escape and evasion methods, with each organization covering different parts of the globe.
During World War II the British and Americans produced several hundred thousand escape and evasion maps. Out of the 35,000 Allied troops who escaped and made their way to safety, it has been estimated that half had a silk map with them.
Some of these escape and evasion maps were distributed in a rather ingenious manner. POWs were allowed to receive packages from family and humanitarian organizations. The Germans searched parcels that were sent by family members. However, they did not search the packages sent by humanitarian organizations because they felt it would be unethical. This provided a way to covertly deliver escape and evasion materials to Allied POWs.
Waddington PLC — maker of Monopoly and other games — was enlisted to help. The company printed special editions of Monopoly and several other board and card games. Maps, compasses, and other tools were hidden inside compartments in the board or game pieces. Under the guise of a fake humanitarian organization, the games were sent to POW camps.
Before leaving on a mission, Allied troops were told to look for games marked in an unusual way if they were captured. For example, a Monopoly game that contained an escape and evasion map had a red dot in the free parking space.
Games were also marked based on where they were being delivered. Waddington produced six different versions of the games based on locations of German POW camps. To indicate where a shipment of games was heading, a period was placed after the corresponding location on the game board. For example, if a shipment of games was bound for Sweden, there would be a period after the “Mayfair” location on the board. This particular game would contain a map of Sweden and the surrounding countries, as well as the correct currency.
The use of silk maps as an escape and evasion tool continues through present day. CIA produced silk maps, for example, during its support for the Tibetan resistance in the 1960s. Today’s “silk” maps are made out of Tyvek, which has similar characteristics to silk.
The CIA Museum currently has on loan from the Colby family a World War II silk escape and evasion map that belonged to former Director of Central Intelligence William Colby. He used the map during OSS Operation RYPE to find his way across the frozen landscape of Norway. Colby’s map is displayed alongside a Tyvek map used during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Afghan Gallery. The juxtaposition of the two objects is a tribute to intelligence officers at war.
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The president and policymakers rely on insights from Central Intelligence Agency products to help form their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the second in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article focuses on geospatial intelligence.
A picture is worth a thousand words: a lesson every intelligence officer learns. Every day satellites in the sky capture the comings and goings of nations around the world. These images may provide the missing piece to the puzzle that can help keep the nation safe.
The Intelligence Community (IC) refers to the use and analysis of geospatial information to assess geographically referenced activities on Earth as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). It is everything you can see or know about the earth.
GEOINT consists of:
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is the prime producer and functional manager for national and allied GEOINT efforts for the IC. CIA analysts often use NGA products to complement their analysis of a situation in finished intelligence.
GEOINT is a layering of multiple sources, including imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information. No one source can do it all. The final product is intelligence that can answer questions such as:
GEOINT because it provides invaluable information about the activities of our adversaries that may help shape foreign policy.
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How good are your survival skills? Could you live in the mountains in the middle of winter with limited food and supplies? Would you be willing to use your skills and risk your life in service of your country?
America’s history is rich with stories about courageous men and women who have gone above and beyond to protect their nation. The story of Office of Strategic Services officer Roderick Stephen Hall and the Brenner Pass assignment is one of the most amazing and inspiring stories. Hall survived for six months in the Italian and Austrian Alps while planning sabotage missions targeting Nazi supply routes.
Roderick Stephen “Steve” Hall was born in Peking, China, in 1915. His father was a successful international businessman and his mother was a doctor. As a young man, Hall attended Phillips Academy Andover.
After graduating in 1933, Hall traveled the world seeking adventure. During his travels, he became an avid outdoorsman. Hall also became very familiar with the Italian Alps — in particular, the Brenner Pass — while he hiked, skied and climbed his way through the area.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States entered World War II. Hall had just returned home from his latest adventure and enrolled at Yale University. However, academic life did not fulfill his yearning for purpose and he dropped out to enlist as a private in the U.S. Army.
Hall’s eagerness to learn and take on new projects served him well. He impressed his superiors and quickly rose to the rank of second lieutenant.
After 10 years of adventure, Hall decided to use his survival skills and knowledge of the Brenner Pass to help his country.
During the war, the Brenner Pass was of vital importance to the Axis powers as a supply route to the Mediterranean.
In the fall of 1943, Hall wrote a letter to officers at the fledgling Office of Strategic Services (OSS) — the predecessor of the CIA — proposing one of the most amazing sabotage missions of World War II.
Dear Mr. Stebbins,
It seems to me, who knows nothing about your organization [OSS], that finding an agent with the necessary personal accouterments to go to Cortina [on the southeast approaches to the Brenner Pass] and carry out missions of sabotage, political organization, reconnaissance, or whatever is desired would be difficult. Even if he was a European, he would encounter official questioning at every turn now, with danger of exposure each time. And traveling by land, how could he carry sufficient explosive and tools to effect sabotage himself, if all other plans failed?
These obstacles could, of course, be overcome one way or another; but here is my suggestion, based on the premise that the sabotage is more important in the near future than political organization:
Drop a man by parachute on the open country between Pocol and the Falzarego Pass and drop enough Army "Mountain Rations" and personal equipment to sustain him indefinitely in the peaks, if necessary. Drop TNT and a tool kit. I believe one could get away with it, if the jump was made in the early dawn when mist rises profusely over the terrain, or through a snow fall.
This man, if he was a good rock and snow climber, and skier, would have no trouble in moving about the valley unnoticed even in the daytime. The matter of tracks in the snow is of no consequence; paths and brooks could cover his movements, and he could always take to the mountain rock.
Operating even under adverse conditions, this man, I believe, could block the Ampezzo highway and railroad beyond use during the winter, anyway, within 3 days after he landed. It should be possible for him to blow out the Drava River roads within another 10 days. Thereafter he could work on whatever opportunities presented themselves.
I feel sure he would not have to search out anti-Nazi elements for laying the plans for continued sabotage: they would come to him. Of course, the problem of how he would get out and save his own skin is all a matter of chance and circumstance. Perhaps he would have to perch on the peak of Antelao nibbling concentrated chocolate until German capitulation.
I would be willing to do the job—and I think I could. Here are my qualifications:
- Trained in military demolitions.
- Trained in mapping, reconnaissance, communications, and similar subjects (am battalion S-2).
- Familiar with the Val Ampezzo, particularly the little-known paths and minor terrain features, from walks and skiing. Skilled in rock and snow climbing, with 15 years experience on the cliffs and snow of N.E., in Wyoming (Grand Tetons ), and Cortina. ... Expert rifle and pistol shot since 1930—Nat'l Rifle Association and Army.
- Physically: somewhat above average endurance; accustomed to living in the open under all conditions; no major operations, illnesses or frailties; 28 years of age.
- Education: ... Am no linguist, but ... picked up enough Italian in 5 days at Cortina to get about conveniently ...
- Personal situation: unmarried, ... ready to go anytime under any circumstances that augur success.
Cordially yours,
R.S.G. Hall
2nd Lt. 270 Engr. (c) Bn.
Camp Adair, Oregon
Hall’s plan was to cut off access to the smaller mountain roads that led to the Brenner Pass.
Hall did not think his letter would get any attention, but he was in for the surprise of a lifetime. His idea caught the attention of the Special Operations (SO) branch of the OSS, which was responsible for sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and other subversive activities. Hall received a letter from the OSS which ordered him to report to Washington, D.C.
After a brief orientation at the OSS headquarters, Hall was sent to a nearby base for training. There, he learned hand-to-hand combat, sabotage techniques, demolitions, and guerrilla warfare tactics.
After graduation, Hall was sent to North Africa to work as a demolitions instructor. His time there did not last long. On June 22, 1944, Hall was pulled out of the demolitions school in Algiers and sent to Caserta, Italy. There, he met with Company D from the 2677th OSS Regiment, who would help him carry out his mission. Hall laid out his plan to cripple the Brenner Pass and had no trouble gaining the support of his men.
Preparations for the mission began. Hall was sent back to Algiers for a crash course in parachuting. Next, Hall gathered the mountaineering equipment his team would need for the mission and took them on an eight-day training run in the Italian mountains where they honed their language and outdoor survival skills.
On the night of August 2, 1944, Hall and his team were finally ready to begin the mission. Hall and his team were dropped at Monte Pala in the foothills of the Alps of northern Italy. Unfortunately, Hall and his team would have to travel 85 dangerous miles to the Brenner Pass, so their real mission did not begin until a week later.
In the dark of the night, Hall and his team crept toward a bridge north of Tolmezzo, Italy. The bridge was so deep in enemy territory that it was unguarded. Hall placed a charge on the bridge and so heavily damaged the structure that it could not support heavy loads.
Hall and his team continued the mission along the way to the Brenner Pass by targeting smaller bridges that were important to communications and motor vehicle supply routes. However, Hall never made it to the Brenner Pass.
After receiving a delivery of supplies, Hall decided to leave his men and visit a friend in a nearby town. Tired, frostbitten, and hungry, he was caught in a blizzard and collapsed in the snow in Campo, a suburb of Cortina. The pastor of a local church found the OSS lieutenant and gave him shelter. Hall was deep in German territory, and while he regained his strength, German police learned of his presence and came to investigate.
Hall was arrested and taken to Cortina, where he was interrogated. In spite of the treatment he received from the Germans, Hall kept silent and never revealed his connection with the OSS.
On February 17, 1945, Hall died in a German prison. To this day, the circumstances of Hall’s death are still questioned. Some believe that he committed suicide, while others believe the Nazis murdered him and arranged it to look like a suicide.
The OSS posthumously awarded Stephen Hall the Legion of Merit — one of the most distinguished military decorations — on September 22, 1945.
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Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon E. Panetta on the New Inspector General
October 7, 2010
I am very pleased to announce that David B. Buckley was sworn in yesterday as CIA’s Inspector General. David was confirmed by the US Senate last week and comes to the job with more than 30 years of federal service in a variety of military, intelligence, investigation, and oversight positions. His deep experience, along with his absolute integrity and commitment to the rule of law, make him exceedingly well-qualified for this critical position.
A robust, independent Inspector General is essential to our success as an Agency. It is also vital to preserving the trust and support of our oversight committees in Congress, and, by extension, the American people. That’s why CIA is indebted to Patricia Lewis, who has led OIG with tremendous skill since early last year. David will draw on her knowledge of our Agency, years of experience, and wise counsel.
From 2005 until 2007, David was Minority Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and, during an earlier stint on Capitol Hill, he was Chief Investigator for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. From 1999 until 2005, he served as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations with the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. He also spent three years as Special Assistant to the Inspector General at the Department of Defense.
David began his career on active duty with the Air Force, followed by several years as a civilian Special Agent in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Immediately prior to his confirmation as our Inspector General, David was a Senior Manager at Deloitte Consulting, LLP, where he worked with clients in intelligence and homeland security.
Please join me in welcoming David to CIA.
Leon E. Panetta
The Intelligence Community today draws wisdom and inspiration from the past. The following article is the third in a series showcasing exceptional intelligence stories from history. This article focuses on how President Woodrow Wilson gathered and used intelligence during the Mexican Revolution.
Two weeks before Woodrow Wilson became president of the United States, Mexico's Gen. Victoriano Huerta overthrew his country's elected president, Francisco Madero. Wilson was concerned because he feared that foreign policy issues might distract from domestic reform measures he wanted to pass through Congress. In fact, during the period 1913-15, Mexico was one of Wilson's main foreign policy concerns, and after June 1914 it was second only to the war in Europe.
Throughout this period, Wilson struggled not only with forming a policy toward Mexico but more with learning what was happening in Mexico's revolution. Wilson did not believe he could trust his primary source of information, the Department of State. Instead of relying on diplomatic reporting, Wilson pulled together a network of formal and informal sources to observe and report on events.
Wilson's efforts to collect information about Mexico's revolution illustrate some of the difficulties presidents faced when gathering intelligence before a more formal intelligence-gathering structure was established with the Coordinator of Information in 1941.
In the early 1900s, the means to collect intelligence were limited. Today’s advanced technology used to gather imagery and intercept phone calls and communications weren’t readily available at the time. Instead, Wilson had to rely on simpler sources of information, including:
However, these sources presented many conflicting perspectives of the situation in Mexico. As a result, President Wilson became very suspicious of these sources.
Presented with conflicting information, Wilson looked for more reliable sources. First he turned to a reporter, William Bayard Hale, who wrote for the progressive journal World's Work. Hale’s assignment was to tour the Latin America states and report back to Wilson.
Hale reached Mexico City on May 24. He sent his first report to the President Wilson on June 18, 1913. His conclusions confirmed Wilson's worst fears. President Madero was overthrown in a coup begun by those opposed to his reforms. To make matters worse, Huerta acted only because he had the active support of the U.S. ambassador to Mexico. On the basis of Hale's reports, President Wilson recalled the ambassador in mid-July 1913.
In August 1913, Hale was joined by John Lind, a former governor of Minnesota and member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Wilson had instructed Lind to press Huerta's government to stop fighting in Mexico and hold a free election in which all parties could participate. In return, the United States promised to recognize the newly elected government. The Huerta regime met with Lind but refused to accede to Wilson's demands.
Wilson used the information he received from Hale, Lind, and other assigned reporters to search for consistent elements and to eliminate his own uncertainties about which Mexican revolutionary faction to support. He believed that pieces of truth would fit together as a whole. The trick was to tease the facts from the propaganda and lies in a rudimentary form of content analysis.
To a lesser extent, Wilson also received intelligence using photography and by tapping telephone lines.
Imagery was limited to ground photography used as tactical intelligence for the military.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) played an important part, but it was largely a counterintelligence tool, used to monitor the activities of foreign intelligence services in the United States. It was limited at the time to tapping telephone lines and telegraph cables, and intercepting wireless radio communications.
SIGINT turned out to be especially useful in the spring of 1915 in preventing Huerta's return to Mexico from exile in Spain, to which he had fled in July 1914. The Germans, eager to embroil the United States in a war with Mexico, courted Huerta.
Treasury Secretary William McAdoo's men tapped German and Austrian diplomatic telephones in Washington and New York and relayed the reports to Wilson. These reports focused more on the activities of German and Austrian diplomats and their possible complicity in sabotage in the United States than they did on Mexico, but they did include information about German plotting in Mexico.
By June 24, 1915, mistakenly thinking he had shaken pursuers, Huerta boarded a train in New York bound for San Francisco, switching later to one for El Paso. At the same time, Villa's representative in Washington reported to the Wilson administration that numerous former Huertista officers were on their way to El Paso from places of exile in the United States. The next day, United States marshals arrested Huerta as he stepped from his train in Newman, Texas, only a few miles from the border. Supporters waiting in a car to drive him across the border were also arrested.
SIGINT thus provided "actionable" information about Huerta's plotting just as Hale's HUMINT had given the president the information he needed to dismiss a U.S. ambassador.
Until late 1915 the information Wilson was receiving could not help him come to a conclusion. In all likelihood, Wilson's ambivalence was also influenced by the efforts of those vying for power in Mexico. Huerta had considerable support in the United States, especially among business leaders, but Wilson's negative opinion of Huerta was firmly set.
Because Wilson insisted on concrete information before acting, he was frustrated by the lack of definitive reporting. Wilson's frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence is neither hard to understand nor uncommon to presidents. To be fair to Wilson's sources, it was not until 1915 that any faction in Mexico gained enough dominance to legitimately earn U.S. recognition.
Lack of definitive judgments on Wilson's part reflected the lack of a stable reality on the ground. By late summer 1915, however, it was clear that Carranza led the most powerful revolutionary faction, and, in October 1915, Wilson extended recognition to Carranza's government.
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October 5, 2010
Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon E. Panetta and Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities President Antonio R. Flores recently signed a landmark memorandum of understanding that creates a partnership between the CIA and HACU to increase the number of Hispanics serving at the Agency. The agreement was signed at the HACU Annual Conference, where Director Panetta provided keynote remarks that highlighted the Agency’s comprehensive program to strengthen the diversity of its workforce.
“My fervent hope is that the mission of the CIA can inspire every part of American society to help this great Agency succeed,” Director Panetta told over 1,000 students, educators, and administrators at the conference. “To do that we have to reflect the full diversity of our nation. Defending America, keeping America safe, is the work of all Americans. And for that reason, your country needs all of you. We need your ingenuity. We need your skills. We need your perspective. We need your knowledge and your insight to help protect a way of life that we all hold dear.”
The memorandum of understanding calls for HACU and the CIA to work together to educate Hispanic students about public service careers with the Agency, and to enlarge the hiring pipeline for them. “Hispanic Americans are writing one of the greatest chapters in the story of our immigrant nation,” Director Panetta said. “America depends on the sheer energy and talent that you bring to the table.”
The three goals of the CIA’s diversity initiative are: to hire talented people from all ethnic, cultural, and educational backgrounds; to give all officers opportunities to excel so that CIA’s leadership ranks become more diverse; and to make the Agency an employer of choice among men and women of all backgrounds.
To further those goals, the Agency earlier this year established the Employee Resource Center led by veteran officer Gerald P. Hamilton. The center has combined, focused, and increased the capabilities of several offices responsible for promoting diversity and equal opportunity at the Agency.
As Director Panetta explained, diversity is mission critical at CIA.
“We need officers who can operate credibly and effectively in just about any society,” he said. “That means things like language fluency and a deep understanding of the local culture. And just as importantly, we need officers who approach intelligence questions from different perspectives based on their different backgrounds: regional, ethnic, educational, and so forth. With a mission that comes down to solving problems and overcoming obstacles, we simply can’t afford to have a workforce of people who all think alike. That’s why I’m committed to making CIA more diverse.”
Statement to Employees by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Leon E. Panetta on National Disability Employment Awareness Month
October 4, 2010
Since 1945, when thousands of our servicemen returned home from the Second World War with permanent disabilities, our nation has set aside time in October to reaffirm the importance of employing the disabled. That tradition has evolved into National Disability Employment Awareness Month, and it’s an opportunity for Americans to think about how we can make better use of the strengths of all our citizens. Our government—and this Agency—remains dedicated to giving everyone a chance to contribute in a job for which he or she is qualified.
In July, President Obama issued an Executive Order that reinforces the Federal Government’s commitment to employ more people with disabilities. The order calls on each agency to develop strategies to increase recruitment and retention of disabled employees over the next five years. We at CIA are proud to be part of that effort, which includes improved access to technology and to the workplace itself, all to ensure the fullest possible contributions to the work of government.
Increased diversity is a major goal of CIA 2015, our blueprint for the future, and that includes more hiring of disabled officers. To those who already advance our mission every day, we pledge to make our Agency an even better place in which to work, one that will make it easier for you to excel. “Disabled” refers to only a single dimension of a person’s identity; it never describes the entire man or woman. By creating greater opportunity for disabled citizens, I want CIA not only to do the right thing—I want our Agency to draw every advantage from the limitless pool of talent that is America. We are a family, and everyone in our family deserves the chance to succeed.
Leon E. Panetta
On September 26, 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) met for the first time. The NSC was one of several creations of the National Security Act of 1947, which also established the Central Intelligence Agency and placed the armed forces under the Secretary of Defense. The Act gave the NSC congressional mandate to coordinate U.S. foreign and defense policy. The Act also gave CIA legal authorities that its forerunner, the Central Intelligence Group had lacked because it was created by executive order.
President Harry S. Truman chaired the NSC, along with six other members, including:
Although chairman, President Truman did not attend NSC meetings regularly until the Korean War broke out in 1950 and did not use the NSC as his principal international security advisory body. However, the NSC served an important function in delineating the responsibilities of the intelligence community in a series of directives that clarified CIA’s duties and authorized it to undertake certain activities not spelled out in its founding legislation.
In December 1947 the NSC issued National Security Council Intelligence Directive 1 (NSCID 1), which set forth the Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) status in relation to the other civilian and military intelligence chiefs. The Directive stated that the intelligence chiefs of the Departments of State and the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission served as the DCI’s board of advisors, not his board of directors.
Later that December the NSC issued National Security Council Directive 4 (NSCID 4), “Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Measures,” whose secret annex, NSC-4A, gave CIA its first explicit covert action authority.
The NSC continued to serve an important role in the Agency’s early development. Under the guidance of the NSC, then-future DCI Allen Dulles spearheaded the Dulles, Jackson, and Correa Report, which recommended several significant reforms of US intelligence and the fledgling CIA.
The report stated that the Agency was not adequately serving its intended purpose, particularly in the production of intelligence estimates and coordinating community intelligence. The report also criticized the leadership of DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter — the same director whom NSCID-1 had officially empowered over the other intelligence chiefs — and recommended that CIA’s intelligence collection and covert action function come under a single division. Hillenkoetter’s successor, Walter Bedell Smith implemented these reforms.
Each presidential administration has tailored its use of the NSC to suit the chief executive’s preferences for obtaining national security advice. Like Truman, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson de-emphasized the NSC in favor of ad hoc groups and select advisors. In contrast, President George H. W. Bush leaned heavily on the NSC and established the system of Principals and Deputies Committees that is still in effect.
Today, the NSC under President Barack Obama consists of:
Additional members of the NSC include the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the statutory military advisor and the Director of National Intelligence as intelligence advisor.
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October 14, 2010
At CIA Headquarters today, Director Leon E. Panetta welcomed David Axelrod, White House Senior Advisor, and his wife, Susan, to the Agency’s launch of the 2010 Combined Federal Campaign. “Our fundamental mission here at the CIA is to protect people. Through our generosity, our service, and our compassion, we can also help people to have better lives,” said Director Panetta, who is Chairman of the Agency’s CFC effort.
The Axelrods spoke about their daughter Lauren’s battle with epilepsy. “In 1998, Susan and two other mothers started a group at the kitchen table called Citizens United for Research on Epilepsy,” David Axelrod told the Agency audience. “In the years since, they’ve proven what the force of a mother’s love can mean to a cause.” The group has raised more than $9 million for scientists working on a cure for the disorder.
During the next several weeks, CIA officers, along with their colleagues across the federal government, will donate money and volunteer their time and effort to fundraisers in support of the campaign.
Last year, the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence raised a record $2.6 million, surpassing the goal. Director Panetta challenged the audience to turn in another strong performance.
“The measure of our humanity is whether we help those in need,” said Director Panetta. “The measure of our life is whether we made a difference in the lives of others.”
The president and policymakers rely on insights from Central Intelligence Agency products to help form their foreign policy decisions. CIA officers use a variety of sources in formulating their assessments. The following article is the fourth in a series that will explore different sources and collection disciplines, which are the building blocks of what we call “finished intelligence.” This article focuses on human intelligence.
Throughout history, information derived from human sources has helped shape foreign policy decisions. If Oleg Penkovsky had not been providing the CIA with detailed information regarding the Soviet’s missile capabilities, the Cuban Missile Crisis might have had a completely different outcome.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) is defined as any information that can be gathered from human sources.
The National Clandestine Service (NCS) is the branch of the CIA responsible for the collection of HUMINT. The NCS is charged with strengthening national security and foreign policy objectives through the clandestine collection of HUMINT.
HUMINT is collected through:
To be successful, NCS officers must understand one of the most complex aspects of running assets — human nature. Emotions, intentions and motivations differ from person-to-person and change overtime. Understanding people, with all of their complexities, is crucial to the business of running assets to collect HUMINT.
Collection methods can take place in a variety of ways, including in-person meetings. Some HUMINT operations are short in duration, while others take years. Through it all, NCS officers must understand and assess the intentions and motivations of their assets, as well as the authenticity of the intelligence they provide. The most successful HUMINT sources provide volumes of intelligence responsive to Intelligence Community requirements.
NCS officers, particularly Collection Management officers, work to ensure that CIA information addresses the gaps in the U.S. government’s knowledge base. When the gaps are most appropriately addressed with HUMINT resources, NCS officers draft intelligence requirements for the asset base. When CIA collection addresses an intelligence requirement, the HUMINT information is disseminated as raw intelligence. In order for CIA assets to remain safe, NCS officers take careful measure to protect the identity of clandestine assets.
The success of NCS operations relies on officers working as a team. All NCS officers—from Targeters identifying future assets, to Staff Operations Officers supporting operations — are crucial to the success of the NCS in meeting the HUMINT needs of the Intelligence Community.
Raw HUMINT is disseminated to the Intelligence Community, including analysts in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence and U.S. Military officers in the field. HUMINT can be used in its raw form to make decisions on the battlefield, or more often, HUMINT, along with other types of intelligence (SIGINT, IMINT, etc.), is analyzed to produce finished intelligence products for U.S. policymakers.
Human intelligence plays a critical role in developing and implementing U.S. foreign and national security policy and in protecting U.S. interests.
HUMINT resources in the NCS are tapped when only a well-placed human asset would have access to the intelligence needed by the President, U.S. Policymakers, the U.S. Military, and other key members of the Intelligence Community. If the intelligence can be collected through other collection methods, then HUMINT resources — with inherent risks to human lives — can be preserved for intelligence requirements for which no other collection method exists. The system of CIA being the collector of last resort is in place because assets and NCS officers have lost their lives collecting HUMINT.
For more information about a career with the NCS, please visit CIA Careers.
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Last December, our Agency family lost seven courageous and talented colleagues in a terrorist attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khowst, Afghanistan. These dedicated men and women were assigned to CIA’s top priority—disrupting and dismantling al-Qa’ida and its militant allies. That work carries, by its very nature, significant risk. CIA is conducting the most aggressive counterterrorism operations in our history, a mission we are pursuing with a level of determination worthy of our fallen heroes. We will sustain that momentum and, whenever possible, intensify our pursuit. We will continue to fight for a safer America.
Earlier this year, I directed that a task force of seasoned Agency professionals conduct a review of the Khowst attack. The purpose was to examine what happened, what lessons were learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent such incidents in the future. In addition, I asked Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Charlie Allen, a highly accomplished former Agency officer, to conduct an independent study of the Khowst attack and to review the work of the task force. They concurred with its findings. One of CIA’s greatest strengths is our ability to learn from experience, refine our methods, and adapt to the shifting tactics of America’s enemies.
The review is now complete, and I would like to thank those who participated. They did our Agency a great service. It was, to be sure, a difficult task—especially since key insights perished with those we lost. Perfect visibility into all that contributed to the attack is therefore impossible. But based on an exhaustive examination of the available information, we have a firm understanding of what our Agency could have done better. In keeping with past practice, we will provide the Khowst report to the Office of Inspector General.
In highly sensitive, complex counterterrorism operations, our officers must often deal with dangerous people in situations involving a high degree of ambiguity and risk. The task force noted that the Khowst assailant fit the description of someone who could offer us access to some of our most vicious enemies. He had already provided information that was independently verified. The decision to meet him at the Khowst base—with the objective of gaining additional intelligence on high priority terrorist targets—was the product of consultations between Headquarters and the field. He had confirmed access within extremist circles, making a covert relationship with him—if he was acting in good faith—potentially very productive. But he had not rejected his terrorist roots. He was, in fact, a brutal murderer.
Mitigating the risk inherent in intelligence operations, especially the most sensitive ones, is essential to success. In this case, the task force determined that the Khowst assailant was not fully vetted and that sufficient security precautions were not taken. These missteps occurred because of shortcomings across several Agency components in areas including communications, documentation, and management oversight. Coupled with a powerful drive to disrupt al-Qa’ida, these factors contributed to the tragedy at Khowst. Each played an important role; none was more important than the others. Based on the findings of the task force and the independent review, responsibility cannot be assigned to any particular individual or group. Rather, it was the intense determination to accomplish the mission that influenced the judgments that were made.
There are no guarantees in the dangerous work of counterterrorism, but the task force identified six key areas that deserve greater focus as we carry out that vital mission. We will:
I have approved 23 specific actions recommended by the task force, some of which I ordered implemented months ago. They provide for organizational and resource changes, communications improvements, tightened security procedures, more focused training, and reinforced counterintelligence practices. These include:
We’ve now taken a hard look at what happened and what needed to be done after the tragedy at Khowst. While we cannot eliminate all of the risks involved in fighting a war, we can and will do a better job of protecting our officers. Drawing on the work of the task force and its insights, it’s time to move forward. Nothing in the report can relieve the pain of losing our seven fallen colleagues. By putting their lives on the line to pursue our nation’s terrorist enemies, they taught us what bravery is all about. It is that legacy that we will always remember in our hearts.
Leon E. Panetta
From President Truman on, each President has written a note of thanks to the men and women of the CIA. These notes are displayed with the President’s official photograph in the Presidential Gallery of the New Headquarters Building. This story is the fourth in a series about the relationship each president has had with the CIA. This article will focus on President John F. Kennedy.
When John F. Kennedy was sworn in as president in January 1961, the world was in great turmoil. The Cold War was heating up, and the United States and the Soviet Union were fighting it out in a space and arms race. During his term, President Kennedy faced one of the most serious national security crises in the nation’s history: the Cuban Missile Crisis. Fortunately, President Kennedy had the help of the Central Intelligence Agency at this disposal.
As Kennedy settled into office, he began to consider who he would nominate as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). He decided on John McCone, a successful business executive with extensive experience in running large organizations and with significant prior service in the U.S. government. Kennedy picked him because he needed someone to carefully manage the CIA in the aftermath of the failed Bay of Pigs operation.
And DCI McCone did just that. In fact, he provided Kennedy with invaluable insights about Soviet intentions that proved accurate. McCone became known for being the first U.S. government official to predict that the Soviet Union would place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba.
On October 14, 1962, a U-2 passing over Cuba captured images of what looked like three nuclear bases near San Cristobal. The CIA analyzed the images, confirmed that the launch sites were real, and informed the National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. On October, 16, Bundy informed President Kennedy of the developing crisis.
President Kennedy quickly formed a working group within the National Security Council called the Executive Committee (ExComm). DCI McCone was the only member from the IC. During the next thirteen days, Kennedy and the ExComm received briefings about Soviet capabilities, including Soviet military intelligence officer named Oleg Penkovsky.
At first, President Kennedy and DCI McCone were convinced that the only way to resolve the crisis was to order air strikes to take out the launch sites immediately. However, intelligence obtained from Penkovsky detailed technical specifications of the missiles, including:
These facts helped persuade President Kennedy that he had enough time to develop a diplomatic solution. After further conversations, President Kennedy and the ExComm decided to issue a naval “quarantine” on Soviet ships bringing military supplies to Cuba.
On the evening of October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation and announced the presence of the missiles and the quarantine. Six days later, Soviet Union Premier Nikita Khrushchev responded and agreed to remove the missiles if the United States promised not to invade Cuba and remove obsolete missiles from Turkey.
And with that, the crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war was over.
President Kennedy recognized the vital role the CIA played in keeping the nation safe. In a letter to DCI McCone, President Kennedy wrote:
“It is, of course, a great source of strength to me to know that we have such dedicated and skilled men and women in the service of our Nation in these times of peril. Although I cannot personally commend each member of the intelligence community for their individual efforts, I would like you to convey to them, through members of the United States Intelligence Board, my personal word of commendation, my deep admiration for their achievements, and the appreciation of a grateful Nation.”
Carrying on the tradition started by President Truman following the Agency’s founding, President Kennedy wrote a note thanking the men and women of the CIA for their service to the United States. He is the third president to write a note that accompanies his portrait in the CIA’s Presidents’ Gallery:
“For the Central Intelligence Agency — with esteem.”
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In order to be successful in protecting the nation, much of the work of the CIA must remain secret. Some might guess that the life of an Agency employee would be one big secret as well. This could not be further from the truth. The Agency promotes a family-friendly work environment and always strives to find the right work/life balance.
Meet CIA officers Grant, Brian, Jaime, Rosemary, and Tara. In this article, they’ll share their insights and talk about what it’s like to be an Agency employee. This story is the second in a series designed to debunk some myths and misconceptions about working at the CIA.
Grant: The Agency did not ask me to give up any aspect of my family relations. In fact, it was quite the contrary. The Agency promotes a family-friendly environment and it has been my experience that managers, for the most part, encourage officers to take time for their families because happy families mean happy and more effective officers. Not only do I see my family every day, I make it a point to see them every day.
Brian: Outside of work, the job looks like just another job — you'll still see your friends and certainly family. There will be times when you're busy — after 9/11, I worked seven days a week for three months — but at CIA, if you're working like it's a national emergency, it probably is a national emergency.
Tara: When I joined the Agency, I thought I'd have to distance myself from my family and friends. It turned out to be quite the opposite. The Agency does its best to ensure its officers find a work/life balance.
Rosemary: Not true. My family members are all in Pennsylvania, and I see them all several times a year, plus they have visited me for Family Day.
Grant: The United States is not a police state and the Agency not only does not support such action, it is forbidden for the Agency to target a U.S. citizen. In my 10 years as an NCS officer, I have never been asked or directed to spy on my family or friends and report on their activities. The only time I “spy” on my family is when we are playing hide-and-seek or when I am seeing if my children are sneaking cookies from the kitchen after they were told ‘no more!’
Tara: The Agency values diversity in its officers and no matter your background, will never ask any officer to spy on their family, friends, or acquaintances.
Grant: There are times when I have served in the field when my family does not know where I am or what I am doing. This is because the nature of the work is designed to protect sources and methods, not to keep my location secret from my family. For example, when I served in the field, I was often out during evening hours and could not tell my family my exact location for security reasons, but my wife always knew who to contact at work — who did know where I was — if there was a problem or if I did not show up when I said I’d be home.
Brian: In my 18 years here, I've always had a desk and phone number where my family could reach me, and they always knew exactly where my office was, even if they couldn't just drop in.
Jaime: For the most part, I've been able to let witting family members know about the places I've travelled. Special circumstances, however, have necessitated being more discreet with unwitting relatives and friends.
Tara: For the most part, officers are able to be open with their family about upcoming travel and in some cases, will even get to accompany them on the longer assignments. But for those officers who travel to the more dangerous and distant corners of the world, there are intra-Agency support networks for families back home. CIA does everything possible to ensure families never feel isolated and have other Agency spouses and families to turn to. It's not always easy but the sense of pride and duty to our country make the temporary separations worth it.
Rosemary: Sometimes I do not tell my family where I am going — be it domestic or foreign — because of the nature of the job, but I always let them know the general region (i.e. Europe, Asia, Africa), and I always bring back souvenirs.
Grant: This is partly true. There are many parts about my job I cannot share. But this relates to national security and protecting sources and methods and not because I am being “secretive” with them. I have told some family members where I work, especially my wife.
Brian: You can't discuss every detail of what you do, but I've always been able to tell my family what general area I was working on and what I did each day.
Jaime: I've always been able to tell my family generally what issues and geographic areas I follow as part of my work.
Rosemary: This depends on the sensitivity of the job at the time. My family knows my job title, but not specific projects that I am working.
Grant: I have served three field tours and my family accompanied me on all three. Two were out of the country and in third world settings, but we had a normal life and enjoyed the different cultures and geographic locations. These tours were great for our children who experienced so many wonderful things. At times, you may not have the creature comforts of home, but my wife and I found we were able to provide essentially the same level of normalcy in each country no matter where we lived.
Brian: Taking my family with me on an overseas tour has been one of the highlights of my career. Families have experiences overseas they'd never have normally, including for my spouse an invitation to a royal cultural event and weekend trips to different countries, to cite just a few examples from one tour.
Tara: One of the benefits of accepting an overseas post is knowing that in most locations, your family can accompany you. Growing up in a culturally diverse family, I've always wanted to raise my children with exposure to cultures other than their own. Children have the benefit of attending American schools and have first-hand exposure to life around the world. What could be better than that?
Rosemary: Normally family will not travel with you on a temporary assignment because it is short-term. And, family can and often do accompany officers to long-term posts, unless there is a safety reason that they should not go. Again, it all depends on what you are doing at the time.
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November 8, 2010
We have seen in recent months a damaging spate of media leaks on a wide range of national security issues. WikiLeaks is but one egregious example. In some cases, CIA sources and methods have been compromised, harming our mission and endangering lives.
When information about our intelligence, our people, or our operations appears in the media, it does incredible damage to our nation’s security and our ability to do our job of protecting the nation. More importantly, it could jeopardize lives. For this reason, such leaks cannot be tolerated. The Office of Security is directed to fully investigate these matters. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information also will be referred to the Department of Justice. Our government is taking a hard line, as demonstrated by the prosecutions of a former National Security Agency official, a Federal Bureau of Investigation linguist, and a State Department contractor.
Here at the Agency, we are a family, which means we depend on each other—sharing burdens, challenges, and successes. But sharing cannot extend beyond the limits set by law and the “need to know” principle. The media, the public, even former colleagues, are not entitled to details of our work.
I would ask that every employee reflect on the responsibilities and privileges of service at CIA. Every officer takes a secrecy oath, which obligates us to protect classified information while we serve at the Agency and after we leave. A vast majority of officers live up to their oath, but even a small number of leaks can do great damage. Our adversaries benefit, while our credibility, our operations, and, ultimately, our ability to accomplish the mission all take a hit. Our sworn duty to the American people is to protect them and we must do nothing to violate the law or that sacred pledge.
Leon E. Panetta
November 10, 2010
Veterans Day is a time to honor all Americans who have fought for our country, to thank those who currently serve, and to think about the price we must pay for our freedom. Ever since our nation’s founding, our democracy has depended on the same essential quality: the willingness of patriots to risk their lives for something bigger than themselves. From Lexington and Concord to Omaha Beach and Kandahar, the sacrifices of our men and women in uniform have kept the American dream alive. Thanks to them, we enjoy the blessings and opportunities of a free society.
Along with our partners in the Armed Forces, our Agency shares the mission of defending our country. We provide the critical intelligence that shapes strategy, protects the troops, and targets the enemy. CIA officers are serving with their military colleagues in the field in greater numbers than ever before. They put their lives on the line and face many of the same hazards that confront our soldiers. Together, our officers and America’s warfighters have forged a common bond against the enemy. We at CIA are very proud of our support to the military.
On Veterans Day 2010, we will pause to remember the sacrifices of those who serve our nation. Their example inspires all of us to carry on the mission of protecting the American people. I extend my deepest gratitude to all of you who have ever served in the military, or who have the honor of working with our partners in uniform. I’ve seen that teamwork in action overseas, in some very dangerous places. All of us at CIA pay tribute to the courage, skill, and generous spirit of Americans who, like those patriots before them, are on the frontlines of the fight for our freedom and for a better world.
Leon E. Panetta
November 9, 2010
The Department of Justice informed me this morning that no criminal charges will be brought against Agency officers for the destruction of video tapes of CIA detainee interrogations. The tapes were made in 2002 and were destroyed in 2005. The Agency has cooperated with the investigation of this issue from the start, and we welcome the decision. We will continue, of course, to cooperate with the Department of Justice on any other aspects of the former program that it reviews. But we are pleased that the decision was made not to charge any Agency officers for the destruction of the tapes.