Gen. Abdul Fatah Younis
Gen. Abdel Fatah Younis, commander of the Libyan rebel forces fighting Muammar Qaddafi, was put to death on the orders of Mustapha Abdul Jalil, head of the rebel Transitional National Council, who wanted him out of the way before the start of peace negotiations, debkafile's intelligence and military sources report.
His execution was set up by TNC officers who first abducted him and the two colonels who never left his side. After they were removed to a point 20 kilometers east of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, all three were shot in the head. The killers brought the bodies back to Benghazi to prove the TNC chief's orders had been carried out and collect their payment.
Younis, a former interior minister, defected to the rebel side in February after working with Qaddafi for 40 years. The circumstances of his death were deliberately confused by Benghazi.
Our sources report that the TNC chief Jalil wanted the powerful Younis out of the way for good before negotiations for the transition of government in Tripoli began. Jalil is a weak figure who enjoys scant respect – even among the Libyan tribes supporting the insurgency. He was clearly concerned that at some point in the negotiations, Gen. Younis's name would be put forward as the most suitable candidate for leading rebel representation in the post-war government in Tripoli, Qaddafi would then appoint his son Saif al-Islam as his successor and the two would run the future government as a team.
This plan is revealed here for the first time. It was already taking shape at the highest levels in Washington, Paris, Moscow and Berlin when it was derailed by the death of Younis. French foreign minister Alain Juppe brought the plan to London on Tuesday, July 26 to help the British government climb down from the demand to keep the war going until Qaddafi quit and departed Libya.
Our sources report that the TNC chief Jalil wanted the powerful Younis out of the way for good before negotiations for the transition of government in Tripoli began. Jalil is a weak figure who enjoys scant respect – even among the Libyan tribes supporting the insurgency. He was clearly concerned that at some point in the negotiations, Gen. Younis's name would be put forward as the most suitable candidate for leading rebel representation in the post-war government in Tripoli, Qaddafi would then appoint his son Saif al-Islam as his successor and the two would run the future government as a team.
This plan is revealed here for the first time. It was already taking shape at the highest levels in Washington, Paris, Moscow and Berlin when it was derailed by the death of Younis. French foreign minister Alain Juppe brought the plan to London on Tuesday, July 26 to help the British government climb down from the demand to keep the war going until Qaddafi quit and departed Libya.
And indeed, the Cameron government agreed to line up behind Washington, Moscow and Berlin and conceded that the Libyan ruler would stay in the country after he stepped down.
But then, on Thursday, the TNC announced the death of the rebels' military chief. It was followed by a claim that pro-Qaddafi loyalists had shot him to impair rebel military capabilities and punish him for defecting. Jalil claimed that Younis had been called to the Benghazi headquarters for questioning but never arrived, tacitly encouraging the rumors that he had been a double agent who secretly served Qaddafi after his defection and made sure the rebels lost the war.
Those rumors were disseminated as a smokescreen to cover Gen. Younis' warning to the rebel administration in closed meetings - starting four months ago - that they would never defeat Qaddafi's army in battle and they would do well to stop the bloodshed and sit down to work out a power-sharing deal.
Those rumors were disseminated as a smokescreen to cover Gen. Younis' warning to the rebel administration in closed meetings - starting four months ago - that they would never defeat Qaddafi's army in battle and they would do well to stop the bloodshed and sit down to work out a power-sharing deal.
The general explained that were it not for the NATO air umbrella and Qaddafi's fear of the losses air strikes would inflict on his army he would have trounced rebel forces in eastern and western Libya and retaken Benghazi in less than a week.
When the TNC leader Jalil refused to heed these warnings and cut rebel losses, Younis gave his field commanders a free hand to negotiate a ceasefire with their opposite numbers on the pro-Qaddafi side. As a result, from the second week of May, an informal truce descended on the main battle fields of Misrata and Brega.
From time to time, rebel headquarters in Benghazi sent out officers with orders to tackle Qaddafi forces in defiance of the truce. But they were no match for the superior strength of government troops and were forced back - proving Gen. Younis had got it right.
When negotiations for ending the conflict hove in sight, Jalil suspected Gen. Younis of planning to beat his own path to Qaddafi and bypassing both the TNC delegation and the NATO powers. The TNC leader resolved to protect his own standing and bid for power by scotching the threat posed by the general.
When negotiations for ending the conflict hove in sight, Jalil suspected Gen. Younis of planning to beat his own path to Qaddafi and bypassing both the TNC delegation and the NATO powers. The TNC leader resolved to protect his own standing and bid for power by scotching the threat posed by the general.
Al-Qaeda WMD Threat Remains After Bin Laden's Death, Ex-Official Says
Friday, July 29, 2011
The death of Osama bin Laden has not eliminated the danger that al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist group will seek to carry out a strike using a biological or chemical weapon, the recently retired director of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center said on Thursday (see GSN, July 27).
"We still have pockets of al-Qaeda around the world who see this as a key way to fight us," the Associated Press quoted Michael Leiter as saying. "The potential threat from [Yemen-based] al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is very real."
"The most likely ... are simple forms of chemical or biological weapons" instead of a nuclear strike, Leiter said.
He cited the lethal toxin ricin, which is fairly easy to produce, as one bioweapon that might be used. Ricin is derived from commercially available castor beans and can be lethal in very small doses. There is no known antidote (see GSN, April 13).
"Is it going to kill many people? No. Is it going to scare people? Yes," the ex-NCC director said.
Leiter told attendees of the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado that younger generations of violent extremists recognize that causing the deaths of a handful of U.S. citizens can cause the same amount of panic as the much larger-scale plots favored by bin Laden.
"Bin Laden was really prioritizing the big attack," Leiter said. "Some of them may have fantasies about pulling off another 9/11," however al-Qaeda offshoots understand they can impact U.S. policy and the country as a whole with lower-level strikes.
"Anwar al-Awlaki gets that," Leiter continued, referring to a leader of al-Qaeda's Yemen franchise. The Pakistani Taliban, which provided training to the failed 2010 Times Square bomber, also understand that, he said (Kimberly Dozier, Associated Press/Google News , July 28).
Leiter said the U.S. populace would do well not to blow out of proportion future low-level terrorist attacks, the New York Times reported.
"The American people need to understand that at least the smaller-scale terrorist attacks are with us for the foreseeable future," he said in Colorado.
"The way that we fundamentally defeat that threat, which is very difficult to stop in its entirety, is to maintain a culture of resilience. Although this threat of terrorism is real and there will be tragic events that lead to the deaths of innocent people, it is not, in my view, an existential threat to our society," he said (Eric Schmitt, New York Times, July 28).
Bin Laden's replacement, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is believed to "probably favor smaller targets," ex-CIA Deputy Deputy Director John McLaughlin said at the Aspen event.
The two former officials agreed that al-Qaeda's central operation saw its strength reduced following the early May shooting death of bin Laden by U.S. commandos who surprised him at his hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, AP reported.
"I think it is now possible ... to actually visualize, to imagine its collapse," McLaughlin said of the organization responsible for plotting the September 11 attacks. He cautioned, though, that Zawahiri and his adherents should not be counted out.
"He's not as charismatic ... but he may be more disciplined," McLaughlin said, noting the longtime al-Qaeda deputy's interest in acquiring and using unconventional weapons (Dozier, Associated Press).
Leiter appeared skeptical of recent U.S. assessments that the central al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan was on the brink of elimination, saying those contentions were without "accuracy and precision," the Times reported.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta earlier this month said U.S. forces were "within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda."
While allowing that the al-Qaeda operation in Pakistan was "on the ropes," Leiter argued that "the core organization is still there and could launch some attacks" and that "Pakistan remains a huge problem" (Schmitt, New York Times)
Pakistani Govt. Collapse Chief Threat to Nuke Security: Report
Friday, July 29, 2011
Extremists would have the best chance to take possession of Pakistani nuclear weapons following the breakdown of the South Asian state's government, the U.S. Congressional Research Service concluded in a report this month (see GSN, July 17).
The research arm of Congress noted that Islamabad in the last decade has made considerable improvements to the security surrounding its growing nuclear arsenal, which the report estimates at today encompassing 90 to 110 warheads. Safeguards include more rigorous vetting of nuclear-weapon personnel, an updated command and control system, and legislation to augment export restrictions and head off development of a proliferation operation akin to the Abdul Qadeer Khan ring.
"However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls," the analysis reads. "While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards."
"The collapse or near-collapse of the Pakistani government is probably the most likely scenario in which militants or terrorists could acquire Pakistani nuclear weapons," according to CRS nonproliferation experts Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin.
Incoming CIA head David Petraeus, while commander of U.S. Central Command in March 2009, told Congress that "Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks."
White House point man for arms control and nonproliferation Gary Samore in May told Arms Control Today that "what I worry about is that, in the context of broader tensions and problems within Pakistani society and polity .... even the best nuclear security measures might break down. ...They have good programs in place; the question is whether those good programs work in the context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present."
Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that same month in an interview with CNN said that "as long as the armed forces of Pakistan are there, there is no danger of the nuclear assets or strategic assets falling in any terrorist hands."
Islamabad is faced with continuing threats from the Taliban and other violent extremist operating within the country. Its security arm was also rocked in May by the U.S. Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in the town of Abbottabad and the subsequent militant assault on a Pakistani naval base in Karachi.
The congressional researchers reasoned that Islamabad's current chief nuclear security issues are "keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and prevention illicit proliferation from insiders."
The United States does not have a detailed picture of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including where all associated facilities are located, officials have acknowledged.
Washington has taken steps to prepare for a Pakistani government collapse that provides a window for extremists to acquire nuclear weapons or material. "We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it," then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in January 2005. That response plan would not involve a U.S. military incursion during an emergency, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage indicated in November 2007.
Rumors about U.S. contingency plans have caused considerable concern inside Pakistan. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman asserted in November 2009 that Islamabad would never "allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities. He added that "no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with U.S. officials."
Washington is assumed to have supplied some atomic security aid to Pakistan by way of "the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability," the analysis states.
"The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country," according to the report. "Pakistan’s response to these proposals is unclear, and downturns in the bilateral relationship overall may have complicated efforts to make progress in this area."
The authors said it was uncertain if Pakistan's increased pace of nuclear weapons development was a result of the atomic civilian trade agreement that India and the United States struck in 2008. Islamabad has repeatedly said the agreement undermines strategic parity with its longtime rival.
With its 2008 waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, India would now be able to purchase nuclear material for its civilian atomic energy reactors from the international market, allowing domestically mined uranium to be used for fueling more warheads, the report states.
Pakistani High Commissioner to the United Kingdom Wajid Shamsul Hasan last October wrote in a newspaper editorial that eight Indian reactors have not been opened up to monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Those reactors together have the potential to enrich enough material for 280 bombs every year, he said. New Delhi is now estimated to hold anywhere from 60 to 100 weapons, according to the CRS report.
"Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same," the researchers wrote.
Additionally, India's significant investment in new military hardware and its focus on reaching "technical superiority" in its reconnaissance, monitoring and ability to precisely strike key targets inside Pakistan could cause the Pakistani government to "respond by lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons," according to nuclear weapons expert Peter Lavoy.
The CRS analysis notes that "Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out first use against a nuclear-armed aggressor, such as India" (Congressional Research Service report, July 20).
The Americans would then come running to save the kingdom, Mojtaba (picture on the left) and Soleimani figured, and head straight into a limited armed clash with Iran. This is what the pair was aiming for to further the following objectives:
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